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TRANSCRIME
Transcrime is the Joint Research Centre on Transnational 
Crime of Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan 
and the University of Trento. The Centre, directed 
by Ernesto U. Savona, Professor of Criminology at 
Università Cattolica, represents the multiannual union 
between experience and innovation in the field of 
criminological research. 
Its offices are located in Milan and Trento. In each 
office there is a team of researchers and secretariat/
management personnel. Transcrime aims at being 
a national and international point of reference in the 
criminological field.
The vision of the Centre is to increase knowledge in 
the criminological field and in the prevention of crimes, 
developing innovative ideas and cutting-edge techniques.  
Transcrime. 
Transcrime combines its experience in applied research 
with the consolidated scientific tradition of Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan and University 
of Trento, mixing a practice-oriented approach with 
a profound understanding of criminal phenomena. 
Through this experience, it developed a solid network 
of relationships in the academic field, institutions, 
international organisations and businesses. 
The Centre also plays an important role in the support 
and development of educational activities at Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan. Its principal aim is to 
achieve close integration between scientific innovation 
and academic education. In particular, since the academic 
year 2005/06, Transcrime has managed a MA programme 
dedicated to crime and security (until academic year 
2012/13 the curriculum Crime&Tech: Crime Sciences 
and Technologies for Security within the MA in Applied 
Social Sciences; since the 2013/14 academic year 
curriculum POLISI: Policies for security within the MA in 
Public Policy). In addition, the Centre has contributed to 
the development of the International Ph.D. programme in 
Criminology, coordinated by Professor Henk van De Bunt 
of Erasmus University (Rotterdam), which is currently the 
only doctoral course dedicated to Criminology in Italy.
Transcrime is an independent academic centre. It 
pursues an autonomous research agenda, which may be 
developed also through contracts and funding by private 
and public local, national and international institutions. 
The source of funding is always made public through 
Transcrime’s website.
Official website: www.transcrime.it
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This report is part of the project The Factbook on the 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (henceforth ITTP)
The project has been developed by Transcrime after 
the Round Table on Proofing EU Regulation against the 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products hosted by Università 
Cattolica of Milan, on 5 May 2011. During the Round 
Table, participants (researchers and policymakers with 
experience in the field of the illicit trade in tobacco 
products) agreed on a research agenda concerning the 
ITTP (Transcrime 2011). Items 3 and 6 of the research 
agenda focused on the need for better analysis of the 
tobacco market taking account of its dual nature (i.e. 
legal and illicit) and how licit and illicit markets vary 
across different countries and regions. Given these 
considerations, Transcrime has developed the ‘Factbook 
on the ITTP’, a multi–annual research plan providing 
detailed analyses of the ITTP and of its relations with 
the legal market and other socio-economic and political 
factors in a number of countries around the world.
The aim of the Factbook is to provide an innovative 
instrument able to shed light on the complex 
mechanisms behind the ITTP in different countries. 
This report focuses on Spain.
THE FACTBOOK ON THE ILLICIT 
TRADE IN TOBACCO PRODUCTS
Tobacco consumption is undoubtedly a danger for human 
health, and governments should carefully regulate the 
tobacco market. Illicit tobacco avoids state regulation and 
taxation and may jeopardize tobacco control policies. 
The Factbook will contribute to raising awareness 
about the global importance of the ITTP and about 
the strategies available to prevent it. The Factbook 
has been developed for a wide readership ranging 
from policymakers, through academics, to interested 
stakeholders, the intention being to provide a support 
to develop knowledge-based debates and policies on 
the ITTP.
The information gathered for this report originates from 
unofficial sources, academic literature, grey literature, 
open sources, questionnaires and interviews with 
experts and stakeholders. Law enforcement authorities’ 
reports and press releases were also a valuable source of 
information for the study. 
The results of the report do not claim to be exhaustive, 
nor an accurate reflection of criminal practices. They 
provide an initial assessment of the ITTP in Spain and 
a starting point for future research.
As a concerned stakeholder in the fight against the illicit 
trade in tobacco products, Philip Morris International 
(PMI) welcomed Transcrime’s initiative to develop the 
Factbook on the ITTP with financial support and the 
provision of data. However, Transcrime retained full 
control and stands guarantor for the independence of 
the research and its results. Information and data for the 
study have been collected by Transcrime and have not 
been shared with PMI.
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This report is part of the project The Factbook on the Illicit 
Trade in Tobacco Products (hereafter ITTP). It focuses on 
Spain, where the illicit trade in tobacco products is an 
emerging issue, particularly in certain regions. After 
tax increases in 2009-2010, Spain became a destination 
market of illicit tobacco and the ITTP penetration peaked 
at 8.8% in 2013. Nevertheless, the ITTP level is lower 
than the European average. In the past, ITTP penetration 
had decreased from 6% to almost 1% between 1998 and 
2010, due to the successful enforcement actions against 
contraband. Spain used to be a transit country.
Non-domestic cigarettes are widespread mainly in two 
Spanish regions, Andalusia and Extremadura. These 
regions are close to Gibraltar, where cigarettes cost half 
the price of Spanish cigarettes. Moreover, Spain also 
comprises the Canary Islands, which have a different 
tax regulation, making cigarettes cheaper than on the 
Spanish mainland. Indeed, Gibraltar and the Canary 
Islands are the main sources of illicit cigarettes.
WHAT CAN BE FOUND IN THIS 
REPORT?
This report is organised into three chapters:
•• Chapter one deals with the five drivers of the 
ITTP: society and economy, legal market, regulation, 
crime environment and enforcement. The drivers are 
important areas whose structures may positively 
or negatively impact on the ITTP. To enable 
comparison with other country profiles, four key 
indicators have been selected for each driver. The 
data for the driver indicators come from comparable 
sources (latest available years). When possible, the 
report provides the most up-to-date data from national 
sources.  
•• Chapter two focuses on the four components 
of the ITTP: demand, supply, products, modus 
operandi and geographical distribution.
•• Chapter three identifies the key factors of the 
ITTP in Spain and frames the drivers in the 
components, analysing how different elements of 
the drivers influence the components of the ITTP.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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THE FIVE DRIVERS 
•• Society and Economy: Spain has been hit hard 
by the global financial crisis. The unemployment 
rate has increased while both GDP per capita and 
household consumption have decreased. The Spanish 
Government is currently being aided by the EU and 
international organisations to accelerate economic 
recovery. Health and education expenditures are 
below the EU average and income inequality is among 
the highest among EU member states.
•• Legal Market: The Spanish tobacco market is 
relatively large on a global scale. However, legal 
cigarette sales have fallen in the past decade 
while hand rolling tobacco (HRT) sales have grown 
significantly. Cigarette prices are high in global terms, 
but cigarettes are relatively affordable. Smoking 
prevalence is high and varies according to the region. 
Andalusia, Murcia and the Valencian Community have 
the highest prevalence. 
•• Regulation: Taxation on tobacco products has 
increased since 2005, and is among the highest on a 
global scale, both as tax incidence on the retail price 
and as monetary value per 1,000 sticks. However, 
the Canary Islands have a different taxation regime, 
enabling lower taxation to be levied on tobacco. There 
is a medium-low level of control on the tobacco supply 
chain and medium-high control on tobacco marketing 
and promotion, and tobacco consumption and sales.
•• Crime Environment: Crime rates have decreased 
in recent years. There is a medium presence of 
organised crime activities mainly centred on drug 
trafficking, property crimes and human trafficking. 
Drug consumption is high, especially for cannabis 
and cocaine. The shadow economy is medium-low in 
extent, while corruption is a growing concern. 
•• Enforcement: Since 2011, Spain has implemented 
two awareness campaigns against the ITTP. 
Moreover, law enforcement agencies and the Spanish 
Customs have stipulated cooperation agreements 
with foreign customs and law enforcement agencies 
to tackle the ITTP. The average penalty for tobacco 
contraband is low, between 0 and 2 years of 
imprisonment. Overall, anti-ITTP action is medium-
low due to the absence of official estimates on, and a 
national action plan against, the ITTP.
THE FOUR COMPONENTS OF THE 
ITTP
•• The demand: The demand for illicit tobacco products 
in Spain responds to the economic crisis, rising 
unemployment, and higher cigarettes prices. Indeed, 
a pack of illicit cigarettes, especially of the most 
popular brands, is sold for half the price of a pack sold 
in the legal market. Illicit tobacco is easily available 
and generally tolerated by Spaniards. 
•• The supply: Individual smugglers and large-scale 
criminal organisations are the main suppliers of illicit 
tobacco in Spain. Price differentials and proximity to 
Gibraltar, Andorra and the Canary Islands, together 
with the current economic crisis, are conditions 
favourable for the supply of illicit tobacco in the 
country.
•• The products: The main tobacco products smuggled 
into Spain are illicit whites and genuine contraband 
cigarettes. In particular, Ducal, American Legend and 
Elixyr are the most widespread illicit whites brands. 
Counterfeit cigarettes have a low incidence within 
the Spanish ITTP. The main source countries of 
illicit cigarettes are the Canary Islands, Andorra and 
Gibraltar.
•• Modus Operandi and Geographical Distribution: 
Several modi operandi are used to traffic illicit tobacco 
in Spain. Both sea routes and inland routes are 
employed: the former for large-scale smuggling, the 
latter for small-scale smuggling. Andorra, Gibraltar 
and the Canary Islands are source hotspots of 
the Spanish ITTP. Finally, the incidence of non-
domestic cigarettes is higher in the Southern region 
of Andalusia and particularly in the ports on the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
9The factbook on the illicit trade in tobacco products   S
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Executive Summary
FRAMING THE COMPONENTS IN 
THE DRIVERS: THE FOUR KEY 
FACTORS OF THE ITTP
The report identifies four key factors of the ITTP in Spain. 
These key factors are the crucial elements through 
which the five drivers determine the features of the 
four components of the ITTP (Figure 1).
•• Economic accessibility: the price of illicit tobacco 
and particularly its relative price compared to the 
price of legal products. 
 • The economic crisis in Spain, the high 
unemployment rate, and the decreased purchasing 
power of Spaniards are conditions favouring the 
demand for illicit tobacco due to its greater economic 
accessibility.
 • Cigarette tax increases have caused a decrease in 
legal cigarettes sales and induced some Spaniards to 
switch to more economically accessible illicit tobacco. 
 • The increase in cigarette prices has generated 
demand for cheaper tobacco products. This is 
shown by the increasing number of Spaniards, in 
particular in Andalusia, crossing the border with 
Gibraltar in search of cheaper cigarettes.
•• Availability: the relative ease with which both 
smugglers and consumers can obtain illicit 
tobacco products.
 • The availability of illicit tobacco in bars, shops, 
street vendors and small markets in Spain impacts 
positively on the demand for and supply of illicit 
tobacco.
Figure 1. The main interactions between the drivers and the ITTP
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
decreasing purchasing power 
Decrease of 
ITTP
Increase of 
ITTP
Society and Economy 
unemployment
illicit tobacco in legal premises
social acceptance of contraband
decreasing GDP per capita
cooperation with EU and non EU agencies
Enforcement
low penalties
Legal Market
proximity to Andorra, the Canary Islands and Gibraltar
rising cigarette prices
lower prices in neighbouring markets
Regulation 
EC Agreements
Free Trade Zones
customer identification and verification
absence of tracking and tracing systems
tobacco retail with licensing
manufacturing/wholesaling/importation without licensing
taxation
CMT supervision of the supply chain
Crime Environment
corruption
ITTP Increase
ITTP Decrease
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 • The widespread social acceptance and tolerance 
of contraband are factors important in boosting the 
availability of illicit tobacco and favouring its demand.
 • Cigarettes with lower prices in the Canary Islands 
and in neighbouring countries (Gibraltar and 
Andorra) increase the availability of tobacco products 
to be bootlegged and smuggled.
 • The regulation or deregulation of the tobacco 
sector impacts both positively and negatively 
on the availability of illicit tobacco. Indeed, on the 
one hand, the presence of a licensing obligation 
for tobacco retailers may reduce the availability of 
illicit tobacco products, as well as the faculty of the 
CMT (Comisionado para el Mercado de Tabacos) to 
request any documents concerning the origin and 
destination of tobacco products. On the other hand, 
the absence of a licensing system for tobacco 
manufacturers, wholesalers and importers may 
increase the diversion of tobacco from the legal supply 
chain. Furthermore, the agreements on supply chain 
control between the EC and the four major tobacco 
companies are legally binding only on the signatory 
parties, not on smaller manufacturers; which may 
increase the diversion of products into illicit channels. 
• A high level of perceived corruption in Spain 
impacts positively on the availability of illicit tobacco.
•• Profitability: the ability of the ITTP to generate 
profits that exceed its operational costs.
 • The proximity to markets such as Andorra, the 
Canary Islands and Gibraltar, where there is a 
significant tax and price differential on tobacco 
products, favours the smuggling of tobacco products, 
increasing the profits of the ITTP.
 • Cigarettes price differentials between Spain and 
other markets make the ITTP in Spain a profitable 
activity. 
•• Risk: the threat of detection/accusation/conviction 
and the sanctions imposable on the actors 
involved in the ITTP.
 • Spaniards’ tolerance of contraband activities may 
boost the demand for and the supply of the ITTP by 
diminishing the risks for the actors involved.
 • The controls of the CMT, providing for customer 
identification and verification of the tobacco supply 
chain, increase the risks for the ITTP. However, the 
presence of loopholes in supply chain controls 
(e.g. the absence of a tracking and tracing system of 
all tobacco manufacturers) impacts on the ITTP by 
decreasing the risks for smugglers.
 • The presence of Free Trade Zones (FTZs), Vigo, 
Barcelona, Cádiz and Grand Canaria, boosts the 
supply of illicit tobacco by decreasing the risks for 
smugglers. 
 • Border permeability between Spain, Andorra, the 
Canary Islands and Gibraltar decreases the risks for 
the illicit suppliers of tobacco. 
 • Law enforcement cooperation in the fight against 
tobacco smuggling may increase the risk for 
smugglers. Indeed, the bilateral and multilateral 
agreements signed by the Spanish Customs with 
other countries impact negatively on the supply of 
illicit tobacco by increasing the risks for smugglers.
 • The low penalties imposed for tobacco smuggling 
in Spain (between 0 and 2 years of imprisonment) 
may decrease the perception of risk among 
smugglers.
Executive Summary
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CONCLUSIONS
The ITTP in Spain has increased in recent years, 
reaching 8.8% of total consumption in 2013. From 1995 
to 2000, the ITTP strongly decreased, remaining stable 
at about 1% of the market until 2011. Thinkcom, a 
research centre of the University of Madrid, reports that 
the ITTP penetration is between 10.23% and 11.75% 
of the cigarettes market in 2013. Illicit whites are 
the most widespread products. Genuine contraband 
cigarettes are the only other product smuggled.
According to Empty Pack Surveys – henceforth  EPSs–
the regions of Andalusia and Extremadura have the 
highest incidence of non-domestic packs collected in 
Spain. In particular, cities in Andalusia, especially 
those with ports, are more likely to receive illicit flows. 
Smugglers exploit sea routes for large-scale smuggling 
and inland routes for small-scale contraband. Studies 
indicate that individual smugglers and large-scale 
criminal organisations are the main suppliers of illicit 
tobacco in Spain.
This report demonstrates that more research and 
accurate data would enable better assessment of the 
ITTP in Spain. Indeed, there are no publicly available 
official estimates of the ITTP in Spain. Furthermore, 
there is no research on the socio-economic 
characteristics of illicit tobacco consumers.
The ITTP varies according to regulatory and law 
enforcement actions. For example, enforcement 
actions against tobacco smuggling in the late 1990s 
contributed to decreasing the ITTP. However, in 2009-
2010 the Government increased taxation on tobacco 
products. As a result, the ITTP in Spain has increased. 
Moreover, in 2011 and 2013, two awareness campaigns 
were launched; the former at national level, the latter 
at regional level, in Andalusia. However, no action 
plan against the ITTP has been implemented to date. 
Furthermore, the retail, manufacturing, wholesaling and 
importation of tobacco products is no longer subject to 
licensing in Spain. This may create loopholes in supply 
chain control at these levels.
Effective action against the ITTP requires comprehensive 
strategies including criminal law, administrative sanctions, 
and other indirect measures aimed at reducing crime 
opportunities.
The evolution of the project showed that countries have 
very different situations in relation to the available data on 
the ITTP. In some cases, the quality of the available data 
is low and there are no official, regularly updated, data. 
Inevitably, this affects the quality and reliability of the 
results. In these cases, institutions, businesses and other 
stakeholders concerned with the ITTP should consider 
how to improve data collection on illicit tobacco. This 
will result in improved knowledge about the ITTP and, in 
turn, in better tobacco control policies, since the impact of 
specific policy measures upon crime may quite often be 
overlooked owing to the lack of reliable data.
After completion of the first phase of the project focused 
on collecting facts and data through the country profiles, 
Transcrime will conduct comparative analysis among the 
countries selected. This will yield additional insights into 
the complexity of the ITTP and allow for the elaboration of 
policy recommendations.
Executive Summary
12
Source: The World Bank
Location:
Spain, officially the Kingdom 
of Spain, is located in 
the Iberian Peninsula in 
Southwestern Europe. 
It borders on France 
(Northeast), Andorra 
(Northeast), Portugal 
(West), Atlantic Ocean 
(Northwest), Gibraltar 
(South) and Mediterranean 
Sea (South). The Spanish 
territory also includes 
the Balearic Islands (in 
the Mediterranean Sea), 
the Canary Islands (in 
the Atlantic Ocean), and 
three exclaves in North 
Africa (Ceuta, Melilla, 
and Peñón de Vélez de 
la Gomera). The country 
consists of 17 autonomous 
communities. Its capital and 
largest city is Madrid. Spain 
covers an area of 505,600 
square kilometres.
Population: 46,647,421 (2013)  
Male: 23,043,826 (49.4%)
Female: 23,603,595 (50.6%)
Growth Annual Rate: -0.2% (2013) 
Age Structure: (0–14) 15.0%; (15–64) 67.0%; (65+) 18.0%
Fertility Rate: 1.3 children born/woman (2012) 
Life expectancy at birth (years): 82.0 (2012)  
GDP: US$ 1,358.26 billion (2013) 
GDP growth: -1.2% (2013) 
Inflation consumer price: 1.4% (2013)   
Income level: High
PT
MA DZ
FR
AD
Balearic Sea
Alboran Sea
Atlantic 
Ocean
Marbella
Algeciras
Granada
Toledo
Parla
Fuenlabrada
Almería
Córdoba Jaén
Dos Hermanas
Albecete
Murcia
Valencia
MálagaCádiz
Getafe
Móstoles
Alcorcon
Leganés
Spain
Salamanca
Valladolid
Burgos
Ourense
Zaragoza
Pamplona
San 
Sebastián
Reus Barcelona
Badalona
Terrassa
Sabadell
L’Hospitalet
Santa Coloma de 
Gramenet
León
Oviedo
Gijón
Santander
Bilbao
Barakaldo
Badajoz
Seville
Huelva
Ceuta GBT
 Melilla
Canary Islands
Balearic Islands
Mataró
Madrid Castellón 
de la Plana
Elche
Alicante
Cartagena
Logroño   
Vitoria-Gasteiz           
Tarragona
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A Coruña
Torrejón de Ardoz
Alcalá de Henares
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WHY FOCUS ON THE ITTP IN SPAIN?
There are several reasons for studying the ITTP in Spain.
First, Spain’s geographical position makes it a transit 
country for illicit tobacco. Indeed, due to its location on the 
Mediterranean Sea, and considering the lower price of 
cigarettes in comparison with other European countries, 
Spain is an important gateway for the illicit tobacco trade 
bound for Northern European countries. 
Second, Spain borders on countries such as Gibraltar 
and Andorra, where cigarettes are significantly cheaper. 
Moreover, the Spanish Canary Islands have a different 
taxation regime on tobacco products, resulting in cheaper 
tobacco products. These issues together have an impact 
on cross-border purchases of tobacco products and 
consequently on the ITTP from these countries/areas to 
Spain’s mainland.
Third, the ITTP in Spain has a regional concentration. 
Indeed, the highest share of non-domestic cigarettes was 
found in the regions on Andalusia and Extremadura. 
Fourth, the social acceptance and tolerance of 
cigarettes smuggling, a severe economic situation and 
the reduced purchasing power of Spaniards have a 
significant impact on the ITTP.
According to the available estimates, the ITTP in 
Spain ranged between 7.5%, 8.2% and 10.3% in 2012 
(KPMG 2013; Euromonitor International 2013a; Ipsos 
2013). In 2013, according to KPMG data, the percentage 
increased to 8.8% (KPMG 2014). Thinkcom provides 
two other estimates for 2013, reporting a lower bound 
ITTP penetration (10.23%) and an upper bound (11.75%) 
(ThinkCom 2013). 
Tobacco is a dual market consisting of a legal and an 
illegal part (Figure 2). The two sides of the market are 
connected with each other. Actions affecting one side of 
the market influence the other side as well.
Figure 2. The dual tobacco market
Legal Market
Illegal Market
Overlap in 
demand
The ITTP comprises different activities and products:  
Smuggling (or contraband): the unlawful movement 
or transportation of tobacco products from one tax 
jurisdiction to another without the payment of applicable 
taxes or in breach of laws prohibiting their import or 
export (Joossens and Raw 2008).
INTRODUCTION
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Counterfeiting: the illegal manufacturing of a product 
bearing or imitating a trademark without the owner’s 
consent. Illegally manufactured products can be sold 
in the source country or smuggled into another country 
(Joossens and Raw 2008).
Bootlegging: the legal purchase of tobacco products 
in a low-tax country and their illegal retail in a high-tax 
country. Bootlegging concerns individuals or small groups 
who smuggle smaller quantities of cigarettes, taking 
advantage of tax differentials, with the aim of making 
extra income (Hornsby and Hobbs 2007).
Illegal manufacturing: cigarettes manufactured 
for consumption, which are not declared to the tax 
authorities. These cigarettes are sold without tax and may 
be manufactured in approved factories or illegal covert 
operations (Joossens et al. 2010).
Unbranded tobacco: manufactured, semi-manufactured 
and even loose leaves of tobacco (also known as ‘chop-
chop’ (Geis 2005)), illegally sold by weight (e.g. in large 
plastic bags, also known as ‘baggies’), with no labelling or 
health warnings and consumed in roll-your-own cigarettes 
or in empty cigarette tubes (Walsh, Paul, and Stojanovski 
2006).
Cheap Whites or Illicit Whites: cigarettes produced 
legally in one country, but normally intended for smuggling 
into countries where there is no prior legal market for 
them. Taxes in production countries are normally paid, 
while they are avoided/evaded in destination countries 
(Allen 2011).
WHAT CAN BE FOUND IN THIS 
REPORT?
This report is organised into three chapters.
Chapter 1 is composed of five subsections analysing the 
five drivers of the ITTP:
1) Society and economy
2) Legal market
3) Regulation
4) Crime environment
5) Enforcement
The drivers are important areas whose structures may 
influence the ITTP positively or negatively. Transcrime 
selected the drivers based on a review of the literature on 
the ITTP and discussions with relevant stakeholders and 
experts. Each subsection provides information on the key 
aspects of each driver.
To enable comparison with other country profiles, each 
driver has four indicators. The data for the drivers’ 
indicators come from different sources and ensure 
comparability among different countries in regard to the 
last available years (e.g. World Bank, WHO, UN). When 
possible, the report provides the most up-to-date data 
from national sources. For four indicators, Transcrime 
has developed composite indicators (see Regulation 
and Enforcement, pp. 33 and 47). Composite indicators 
assess the presence of specific policy measures in the 
country and range from 0 (no measure is present) to 5 (all 
measures are present). A higher value on the composite 
indicators does not always imply a better situation. The 
purpose of such indicators is rather to assess the intensity 
of policy measures in a specific field. The information 
used for the assessment is drawn from the literature, 
official sources (reports, websites, legislation), and 
experts.
Chapter 2 analyses the illicit trade in Spain, dividing it 
into the four components of the ITTP:
1) Demand
2) Supply 
3) Products
4) Modus operandi and geographical distribution.
Chapter 3 combines the results of the two previous 
chapters to identify the four key factors of the ITTP and 
show how the various elements of the drivers influence 
the illicit trade. The four key factors are the following:
1) Economic accessibility
2) Availability
3) Profitability
4) Risk.
These factors are pivotal for demonstrating how the 
various elements of each driver influence the illicit trade.
Introduction
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SOCIETY AND ECONOMY
Spain has been hit hard by the global financial 
crisis. The unemployment rate has increased while 
both GDP per capita and household consumption have 
decreased. The Spanish Government is currently been 
aided by the EU and international organisations to 
accelerate its economic recovery. Health and education 
expenditures are below the EU average and income 
inequality is among the highest among EU member 
states.
Low % 
18
Society and Economy
0.32
13 out of 34 countries
(late 2000s)
Income Inequality
GINI coefficient after taxes
Source: OECD
Education System
Education expenditure
as % of GDP
Source: The World Bank
4.5% 
28 out of 163 countries
(2011)
13.8%
49 out of 213 countries
(2010)
Unemployment
Total unemployment 
rate (% of labour force)
Source: OECD
25.2% 
1 out of 35 countries
(2012)
Adult Population
Population aged 15+
Source: The World Bank
84.8% 
26 out of 225 countries
(2012)
Migration
International migrant stock
as % of population
Source: The World Bank
High % 
Low % 
High
Low
High % 
Low % 
High % 
Low % 
High % 
Low % 
Last national available data (2013): 26.4% (INE 2014)
3.2
2008
-61,843
-89,331
-90,805
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Chapter 1: The Five Drivers
•• Spain is a developed country with a large 
percentage of adults in the population.  
 • Spain is composed of 17 autonomous communities 
including the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, 
two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) and three 
small Spanish possessions off the coast of Morocco 
(Chafarinas Islands, Peñon de Alhucemas, and Peñón 
de Vélez de la Gomera) (CIA 2012a).
 • The Spanish Human Development Index was 
0.885 in 2012 and the country ranked 23rd out of 186 
countries (UNDP 2013).
 • Spain has a population of 46.22 mn inhabitants 
and it has a high percentage of adults in the total 
population. In 2012, Spain ranked 26th out of 225 
countries, with 84.8% of its population aged over 15 
(The World Bank 2012).
•• Spain has been hit hard by the global financial 
crisis. Since 2007, GDP per capita has decreased, 
while general public debt has increased 
considerably (Figure 3).
 • Before the crisis, the GDP per capita was rising 
in Spain. After almost 15 years of GDP per capita 
increases, the Spanish economy began to slow down 
in late 2007 and entered into a recession in 2008 (CIA 
2012a).
 • The economy has undergone a prolonged recession 
since the outbreak of the economic financial crisis in 
2008. The burst of the housing bubble and structural 
weaknesses, especially in the labour market, have 
been compounded by the European debt crisis 
(OECD 2012c).
 • The average Spanish household has been severely 
affected by the crisis, with visible impacts on 
household income, jobs, life satisfaction and 
civic engagement. Between 2007 and 2011, the 
real household disposable income declined by 
5%, which was one of the largest declines among the 
OECD countries (OECD 2013a).
 • In Spain, public debt as a percentage of GDP is 
high, 84.10% in 2012. In Europe, only Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Ireland, Belgium and France have higher 
public debts. On a global level, Spain’s public debt 
is high and the country ranks 26th out of 155 
countries (CIA 2012a).
 • According to the Sociological investigation 
‘Barometer’ of January 2014, in Spaniards’ opinion, 
unemployment is the main problem affecting the 
country (54.4% respondents). The second major 
problem concerns corruption and fraud (18.3%) (CIS 
2014).
 • People’s trust in institutions and in how democracy 
works has also declined during the crisis. The 
percentage of Spanish people reporting that they 
trust the government fell from 48% to 34% between 
2007 and 2012 (OECD 2013a).
Figure 3. GDP per capita PPP (constant 2005 International $), 
general government gross debt (as % of GDP), unemployment rate 
(persons aged +15), 2001-2012                                                         
Source: Transcrime elaboration on World Bank (2012) and Eurostat (2013) data
•• The adoption of international economic measures 
is aimed at helping the Spanish economy.
 • In June 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding set 
out the conditions for the Spanish government to 
receive $130 bn in EU funds to recapitalise its banks 
and the real estate sector (CIA 2012a). The European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund are in charge of 
monitoring the progress made within the framework of 
this recapitalisation (OECD 2012c).
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•• The global financial crisis has significantly 
affected unemployment (Figure 4).
 • Spain has a very high unemployment rate. In 2012, 
25.2% of the labour force was unemployed and Spain 
had the highest unemployment rate among 35 
OECD countries (OECD 2012a). The unemployment 
rate reached 26.3% in 2013 (OECD 2013b).
• In Spain, half the female labour force is 
unemployed. In 2013, female unemployment reached 
55%, increasing by around 3 p.p. from the previous 
year (51.9%) (OECD 2013b).
• The largest impacts of the crisis on people’s wellbeing 
consist in lower employment and deteriorating 
labour market conditions. Between 2007 and 2012, 
the employment rate decreased by more than 10 
p.p. in Spain, while the long-term unemployment rate 
increased by 9 p.p. (OECD 2013a). 
• During the economic crisis, youth unemployment 
has risen by 30 p.p., while it has grown by 12 p.p. 
for adult workers. This is mainly due to the high 
prevalence among young people of temporary 
contracts. The increase in youth unemployment in 
Spain is the highest among OECD countries (OECD 
2012c). 
Figure 4. Unemployment rate in Spain, people aged +15, 2000-2013    
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OECD (2013) data
•• On the Spanish mainland, the regions with the 
highest unemployment rates are the southern 
regions of Andalusia and Extremadura (Figure 5).
 • While the national unemployment rate in 2013 was 
26.4%, Andalusia and Extremadura recorded the 
highest unemployment rates with 36.3% and 33.7% 
respectively (INE 2014a). 
Figure 5. Unemployment rate in Spanish administrative regions 
(including Ceuta, Melilla, the Balearic and Canary Islands), 2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on INE (2014a) data
•• After 14 years of successive increases in 
household consumption expenditure (1993-
2007), since 2007 final household consumption 
expenditure has been decreasing (Figure 6, p. 21) 
(The World Bank 2012). 
 • Household expenditure grew until 2007. Between 
2007 and 2012, it decreased by about 10.6% (The 
World Bank 2012). The largest decrease in household 
final consumption expenditure occurred in 2009, when 
it decreased by 4.5% in comparison with 2008 (The 
World Bank 2012).
 • In 2011, most of household consumption concerned 
‘Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels’ 
(21.5%), ‘Hotels, bars and restaurants’ (18.6%) and 
‘Food and non-alcoholic beverages’ (14.6%). Since 
2007, household final consumption expenditure has 
decreased in several categories. Between 2010 and 
2011, the categories with the largest decreases were 
‘Alcoholic beverages, narcotics and tobacco’ and 
‘transport’ (-9.6% and -5.5% respectively) (INE 2013).
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Figure 6. Household final consumption expenditure (constant 2005 
US$), 1994-2012                                                                              
Source: Source: Transcrime elaboration on the World Bank (2012) data
•• As regards equality in the distribution of family 
income, Spain ranks 104th out of 136 countries 
for income inequality (CIA 2012b). Among 
OECD countries, the country ranks 13th out of 
34 countries. Together with the UK and Italy, which 
record higher income inequality, Spain is the least 
equal among EU member states (OECD 2013b).
• In 2012, around 22.2% of Spanish people were at 
risk of poverty. This figure has remained stable since 
2011. However it has increased in the last decade. 
Indeed, the percentage of people at risk of poverty in 
2003 was 19.0% (The World Bank 2012). 
 • The regions on mainland Spain with the largest risk 
of poverty are Extremadura (34.1%), Castilla-
La Mancha (33.1%) and Andalusia (31.0%). 
Considering the non-peninsular territory of Spain, 
Melilla, Ceuta and the Canary Islands are at high risk 
of poverty, 36.6%, 36.2% and 33.2% of the population 
respectively (INE 2012a).
•• Health and education expenditures are average on 
a global level, but below the EU average.
 • Spain ranked 28th out of 163 countries in 2011 
for education expenditure (4.5% of GDP in 2011). 
This figure has increased steadily, rising from 3.7% in 
2005 to 4.5% of GDP in 2011. The level of education 
expenditure is above the global average (3.0%), but 
below the EU average of 4.9% (The World Bank 
2012).
 • In 2011, total health expenditure was 9.44% of 
GDP. This figure is below the EU average of 10.14% 
of GDP, but above the global average of 6.9% of GDP. 
Per capita government expenditure on health was 
US$3,027 in 2011 (The World Bank 2012). 
 • In 2011, life expectancy at birth was 82 years, 
above the European average (79.0) (The World Bank 
2012). During the same year, life expectancy was the 
lowest in Andalusia and Melilla (80.8 and 80.4 years 
respectively), and the highest in the Community of 
Madrid (83.7 years) (INE 2013).
 • In 2011, the largest share of government 
expenditure was on social protection (37.4%), health 
(14.1%) and general public services (12.5%) (Figure 
7) (OECD 2013c).
Figure 7. Composition of total public spending, % of total government 
spending 2011                                                                                  
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OECD (2013c) data
•• Spain has a large and increasing migrant 
population.
 • As regards migration stock, Spain ranked 49th 
out of 213 countries in 2010, when the migrant 
population was 13.8% (The World Bank 2012). 
This is a significant increase in comparison with 
2005, when the migration stock was 10.6% of the 
population. 
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 • In 2011, 86.5% of the population was Spanish, 13.5% 
was born abroad. In particular, foreigners were mainly 
from Latin America (5.0%), other EU member states 
(4.6%) and Africa (2.3%) (INE 2013).
 • In 2012, the administrative regions or autonomous 
communities with the highest share of foreigners 
were the Balearic Islands (21.7% of the population), 
the Valencian Community (17.2%), the Region 
of Murcia (16.2%), Catalonia (15.7%) and the 
Community of Madrid (15.6%) (INE 2013).
International organisations and the EU 
are supporting the Spanish government in 
recapitalising its financial sector and boosting 
the economic recovery. Indeed, since the 
beginning of the global financial crisis, 
unemployment has been increasing, while GDP 
per capita and consumption expenditure have 
decreased. Health and education expenditure 
are below the EU average and income inequality 
is among the highest among EU member states.
Society and Economy
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The Spanish tobacco market is relatively large 
on a global scale and tobacco imports have always 
exceeded exports. In the past decade domestic sales 
of cigarettes have fallen, while HRT has grown 
significantly. Cigarette prices are high in global terms, 
but cigarettes are relatively affordable. Smoking 
prevalence is high and varies among Spanish regions.
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Last available data (2012): Daily smokers 33%(male), 13%(female) (Lithuanian statistics department 2013)
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 TOBACCO MARKET
•• The Spanish tobacco market on Spain’s mainland, 
the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, has rules 
and a taxation regime different from the tobacco 
market in the Canary Islands.
 • According to Law 13/1998, the retail of tobacco 
products on the Spanish mainland, the Balearic 
Islands, Ceuta and Melilla is under the Spanish state’s 
monopoly and is subject to an homogenous taxation 
regime. Instead, the retail of tobacco products in the 
Canary Islands is not under the Spanish monopoly and 
has a different taxation regime (CMT 2014a). 
•• Spain has been a traditional producer of 
tobacco products (Figure 8). In 2011, it was the 
fifth producer of raw tobacco in the European 
Union (14% of European production) (European 
Commission 2011a).
 • Since 2007, after the implementation of the reform 
of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) at the 
European level, tobacco production in Spain has 
declined due to the decrease in financial support for 
the sector (Euromonitor International 2012). 
 • Production in Spain fell from 40,171 tonnes of raw 
tobacco produced (11.6% of European tobacco 
production) in 2006, to 29,275 tonnes in 2011 (14% 
of European production). The number of workers in 
the tobacco industry in Spain was 5,200 in 2012. 
The number increased by 7.8 % in comparison with 
2011, when it was 4,825 (Ministerio de Agricultura 
2013). 
 • The cultivation of tobacco traditionally occurred 
in the southern regions of Extremadura and 
Andalusia. In 2011, 93% of the production of tobacco 
occurred in Extremadura. The other regions had 
minor shares (between 0.1% and 5.8%) (Ministerio de 
Agricultura 2013). 
Figure 8. Cigarette production, imports, exports and sales in mn 
cigarettes, 2002-2012                                                                      
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2013a) data
•• In Spain, tobacco imports have always exceeded 
exports. 
 • Spain is one of the largest importers of tobacco 
products. Indeed, it has a negative balance of trade 
and ranks 70th out of 72 countries. In 2012, the country 
exported around 973 mn cigarettes while it imported 
around 50,000 mn cigarettes. Since 2007, cigarette 
imports volumes have been in line with cigarette sales 
volumes (Figure 8) (Euromonitor International 2013a). 
•• Tobacco sales have strongly decreased since 
2008, with differences among regions.
 • The Spanish tobacco market experienced a strong 
decrease in sales, falling from 97.1 bn cigarettes 
in 2002 to 52.4 bn in 2012 (-46%). This reduction 
may be related to the economic crisis and to higher 
unemployment, but also to tobacco control measures 
such as the introduction of a Minimum Excise Tax on 
cigarettes and HRT in 2006 and 2009 respectively (see 
Regulation, p.33) (Euromonitor International 2012; 
2013a).  
 • Cigarettes sales again decreased in 2013, reaching 
47.5 bn cigarettes (-11% compared to 2012) (CMT 
2014b). Indeed, 91% of tobacconists confirmed 
that their sales dropped by an average of 38% 
between 2012 and 2013 and they expected that sales 
would continue to fall in 2014 (Millward Brown 2013).
 • The decrease in cigarettes sales differs across 
Spanish regions (Figure 9, p.26). Indeed, the highest 
decrease between 2008 and 2013 was recorded 
in Andalusia (-56.5%), Valencian Community 
(-49.9%), the Balearic Islands (-49.6%) and Catalonia 
(-48.1%) (CMT 2014b). 
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•• The Spanish tobacco market is large in terms of 
retail volume on a global scale. Cigarettes have 
the largest share of the market (Euromonitor 
International 2013a). 
 • In 2012, the sales of tobacco products reached 
a value of €11.9 bn. The volume of the Spanish 
market was 52.4 bn sticks in the same year. The 
Spanish market is large in terms of volume of 
sales on a global scale (18th out of 209 countries) 
(Euromonitor International 2013a).
•• Cigarettes are the most popular tobacco product, 
although the HRT share is increasing (Figure 10 
and Figure 11, p.27).
 • Cigarettes constituted almost 85% of the Spanish 
tobacco market in 2012. HRT is the second most 
popular product, with a share of 10.2%; cigars have a 
3.4% share. Moreover, pipe tobacco has a 1.4% share 
of the market (Euromonitor International 2013a).
• The share of HRT has increased in the past ten 
years, from 1.2%, to 10.2% in 2012. Conversely, the 
share of cigarettes has decreased from 97.5% 
to 85% in the same period. Cigars sales have also 
increased in the past decade, mainly due to the 
growth of cigarillos consumption (favoured by a lower 
taxation) which has compensated for the decrease in 
cigars (from 1% to 3.4%) (Euromonitor International 
2013a).
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Figure 9. Cigarette sales per region, % change 2008-2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CMT (2014b) data
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Figure 10. Cigarettes, HRT, cigars and pipe tobacco volume shares, 
2012                                                                                                
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2013) data
Figure 11. Cigarettes, HRT, cigars and pipe tobacco volume shares, 
2002-2012                                                                                         
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2013) data
•• Cigarette sales have decreased by 46% in the past 
ten years (2002-2012) in Spain; conversely HRT 
sales have registered a 410% growth (Euromonitor 
International 2013a).
• The volume of cigarettes sales has decreased in 
the past decade (-46% between 2002 and 2012), 
from 97.1 bn sticks in 2002 to 52.4 bn sticks in 2012 
(Figure 12). The sharpest decrease was recorded 
between 2009 and 2010 (-11%) (Euromonitor 
International 2013a).
 • The volume of HRT sales has increased (+410% 
between 2002 and 2012), from 1,236 tonnes in 2002, 
to 6,307 in 2012. The sharpest increase, +45.8%, 
occurred between 2002 and 2003 (Figure 12) 
(Euromonitor International 2013a). 
•• The introduction of a Minimum Excise Tax (MET) 
on cigarettes in 2006, and its subsequent hikes, 
lifted the cigarettes price-bottom and compressed 
the prices distribution. It reduced possibilities 
for downtrading to cheaper cigarette brands, 
and instead stimulated the switch to HRT (see 
Regulation, p.33) (López-Nicolás, Cobacho, and 
Fernández 2013).
 • HRT bore no minimum tax on quantity until 2009, and 
the level of this new tax has not closed the price gap 
between manufactured and hand-rolled cigarettes. 
The availability of a cheaper alternative (HRT) in 
a period when cigarettes were becoming more 
expensive may have deterred price-sensitive smokers 
from quitting and persuaded them to switch to HRT 
(Figure 12) (López-Nicolás, Cobacho, and Fernández 
2013).
Figure 12. Cigarettes and HRT annual growth (%), 2003-2013                           
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2003-2012) and CMT data 
(2013)
•• In 2013, the main source countries for legal non-
domestic cigarettes were Gibraltar  (33% of the 
legal non-domestic packs) and Andorra (23%) in 
2012 (Figure 13, p.28, KPMG 2014). 
 • Andorra and the Canary Islands were major source 
countries of legal cigarettes between 2007 and 2012. 
In 2013, the share of the Canary Islands among legal 
non-domestic cigarettes declined, falling from 44% in 
2012, to 9% in 2013. This decrease may be explained 
by the reduction in the number of packs that can be 
legally exported from the Canary Islands (2 cartons). 
Conversely, inflows from Gibraltar have increased. In 
2013, Gibraltar accounted for a 33% share of legal 
non-domestic cigarettes in Spain (KPMG 2014). 
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Figure 13. Legal non–domestic packs by market of origin. Percentages 
of total non–domestic legal packs, 2006–2013                                                                                    
Source: Transcrime elaboration on KPMG 2014 data 
 
•• Multinational companies lead the Spanish tobacco 
market (Euromonitor International 2012).
• The four major tobacco manufacturers accounted for 
95.47% of cigarettes sales in 2013 (95.72% in 2012). 
(CMT 2014c). Other minor players  were Grand River 
Enterprises (1.13% market share), HVL (1.12%), Von 
Eicken (1.01%), Karelia Tobacco Company (0.44%), 
Dos Santos (0.24%) and other companies (0.59%) 
(CMT 2014c).
• The Spanish subsidiary of Imperial Tobacco Group 
Plc, Altadis-Imperial, is the leading player in the 
Spanish tobacco market. Indeed, it has the largest 
volume share in the cigarettes market (32% in 2013). 
The company also ranks first for the HRT segment, 
with a 27.76% volume share in December 2013 (CMT 
2014c).
• In 2013, Philip Morris Spain SA ranked second in 
cigarettes sales with 31.1% volume share., PMI’s 
share in the HRT market, in December 2013, was 
12.62% (CMT 2014c). The company was established 
in 1971 and, in 2007, it signed agreements with 
the Ministry of Agriculture and has increased its 
purchases of Spanish tobacco leaves (Euromonitor 
International 2013a; Philip Morris Spain 2014).
• JT International Iberia SL ranks third in cigarettes 
with a 21.6% volume share in 2013. As for HRT, it 
ranks second, with a 12.84% share in December 2013 
(Euromonitor International 2013a).
• British American Tobacco España SA, founded in 
1990, ranks fourth in cigarettes with a 10.75% volume 
share (yearly share for 2013) and fourth in HRT 
with a 7.44% share in December 2013 (Euromonitor 
International 2013a).
•• Tobacconists and vending machines are the only 
legal distribution channels of tobacco products 
(Euromonitor International 2012).
 • In Spain, there were 16,049 tobacconists in 2013. 
They are distributed across the country according 
to the number of inhabitants per region. Indeed, five 
regions (Andalusia, Catalonia, Castile and León, 
Galicia and Valencian Community) comprise almost 
60% of the Spanish retailers. In Andalusia there are 
2,630 tobacconists (16.3% of the total), in Catalonia 
1,953 (12.2%), in Castile and León 1,687 (10.5%), in 
Galicia 1,675 (10.4%) and in Valencian Community 
1,491 (9.3%) (CMT 2013).
 • According to a survey carried out in 2013, because 
of the strong reduction in cigarettes sales, 9.8% of 
tobacconists felt that their business was ‘hanging by 
a thread’ and 8.6% had ‘seriously considered closing 
their business’ (Millward Brown 2013). Tobacconists 
mainly attributed this decline to the illicit tobacco 
trade (86%), followed by the economic crisis (38%) 
and the increase in tobacco prices (30%) (Figure 14). 
Only 3% of the tobacconists interviewed thought that 
tax increases negatively influenced cigarettes sales 
(Millward Brown 2013).
Figure 14. Tobacconists’ opinions on the decrease in cigarette sales, 
2013                                                                                                
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Millward Brown (2013) data
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 • The reduction in prevalence may be attributable to 
smoking bans, price increases and the reduced 
purchasing power of the Spanish population 
connected with the growing financial crisis in Spain 
(Euromonitor International 2012). 
•• Smoking prevalence differs among Spanish 
regions (Figure 15).
 • In 2011-2012, Andalusia was the region with the 
highest smoking prevalence (30.2%), followed by 
the Valencian Community (30.1%) and Extremadura 
(27.6%). In the same years, the region with the lowest 
smoking prevalence was the Community of Madrid 
(24.1%) (INE 2012b).
TOBACCO CONSUMPTION
•• Smoking prevalence is high in Spain (Euromonitor 
International 2012).
 • According to the WHO, in 2009 Spain had a smoking 
prevalence of 32%, the 24th highest among the 
147 countries surveyed (WHO 2012). According to 
the Spanish nationwide health survey, the smoking 
prevalence in 2011-2012 was 26.9%. It had decreased 
by approximately 5 p.p. since 2003, when it was 31% 
(INE 2012b).
 • According to other sources, smoking prevalence was 
22.8% in 2012 (Daily smokers, +18) (Euromonitor 
International 2013a). During the last decade, the 
strongest reduction in cigarettes consumption 
was registered between 2002 and 2003, decreasing 
from 31.7% of the adult population to 28.1% 
(Euromonitor International 2013a).
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Figure 15. Smoking prevalence in 2011-2012 per region
Source: Transcrime elaboration on INE (2012b) data
Chapter 1: The Five Drivers
30
•• Men smoke more than women and exhibit different 
patterns of consumption, also according to age 
group (Figure 16 and Figure 17).
• The prevalence of smoking is 27.1% among men 
and 18.7% among women (Figure 16) (Euromonitor 
International 2012). Moreover, men smoke more 
cigarettes than women. Indeed, in 2012, the majority 
of men declared that they smoked more than 20 
cigarettes per day (41.5%), women between 10 and 
19 cigarettes per day (36.8%) (INE 2012b). In 2013, 
the WHO Global Tobacco Epidemic reported that 
males smoked 31.2 cigarettes daily, females 21.3 
(WHO 2013a).
 • The age group with the highest smoking 
prevalence is the 25-65 group, with a 32.8% 
prevalence in 2011-2012, followed by the 15-24 age 
group (26.3% in 2011-2012) (Figure 17) (INE 2012b).
Figure 16. Smoking prevalence, by sex, 2002-2012
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor (2013a) data
Figure 17. Smoking prevalence, by sex and age, 2011-2012
Source: Transcrime elaboration on INE (2012b) data (Encuesta Nacional de Salud 2011-2012) 
•• Educational levels have an effect on the likelihood 
of being a smoker. 
 • People with secondary school education or a 
higher diploma (e.g. from a vocational school) 
are more likely to smoke (31.8% and 28.1% 
respectively). Moreover, only 22.3% of persons with 
an elementary school education, and 22.5% of those 
with a university degree smoke (INE 2012b).
•• People with different occupational statuses have 
different smoking prevalences.
 • According to the National Health Survey, cigarette 
smoking prevalence is the highest among 
skilled and semi-skilled manual workers (29.0% 
and 29.1% respectively) and the lowest among 
executives and managers with university degrees 
(21.9%) (INE 2012b).
•• The relative affordability of cigarettes is high.
 • Cigarettes are relatively affordable in Spain. In 2012, 
1.7% of per capita GDP was needed to purchase 100 
20-cigarette packs of the cheapest brand (1.5% in 
2010). The country ranks 135th out of 162 countries 
for cigarettes affordability (Eriksen, Mackay, and Ross 
2012).
 • The most sold brand in 2013 was Marlboro, with a 
13.37% share, followed by Chesterfield (9.31%) and 
Fortuna (7.78%) (CMT 2014c). In 2010, the price of 
Marlboro expressed in International$ was 4.41.1 This 
was the 42nd highest price among the 166 surveyed 
by the WHO (WHO 2011a). In 2013, this price 
increased by 26% and reached 5.56 International$ 
(WHO 2013b).
1. An ‘international dollar’ would buy in the country cited a 
comparable amount of goods and services that a U.S. dollar 
would buy in the United States. This term is often used in 
conjunction with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) data. ‘Constant’ 
series show the data for each year in the value of a particular 
base year. Constant series are used to measure the true growth 
of a series, i.e. adjusting for the effects of price inflation.
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• In 2013, the average price of a pack of cigarettes in 
Spain was €4.30 (€4.04 in 2012) (CMT 2014c). The 
price differential between the most expensive and the 
cheapest brand was €2.80. In 2013, Davidoff (Altadis-
Imperial) was the most expensive brand and cost €4.9 
per pack, while Business Club was the cheapest and 
cost €3.1 per pack (Euromonitor International 2013a; 
CMT 2014d).
•• Some smokers have traded down to legal cheaper 
tobacco products during the economic recession.
Figure 18. Cigarettes and HRT sales (volume), 2002-2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2002-2012) and CMT (2013) 
data
 
• Spanish smokers switched to less expensive tobacco 
products to compensate for increasing cigarettes 
prices and maintain their smoking behaviours (Figure 
18 and Table 1) (Euromonitor International 2012; 
2013a).
 • Cigarette price increases, due to higher taxation, 
caused a mass migration to HRT. Indeed, HRT has 
been the best performer in the Spanish tobacco 
market since the beginning of the economic-financial 
crisis (Table 1) (Euromonitor International 2012; 
2013a).
•• Tobacco companies have responded to 
decreasing sales and consumers’ downtrading 
by reducing cigarette prices and introducing soft 
packs.
 • Tobacco companies have reduced the prices of 
premium brands in order to reduce the gap between 
the different price bands and inhibit consumers from 
trading down to cheaper products (Euromonitor 
International 2012).
 • The most sold cigarettes are mid-priced ones. 
However, their share is contracting. It was equal to 
71% in 2002, 64.9% in 2012. The share of premium 
brands increased from 22.0% in 2002 to 26.5% in 
2012, while that of economy brands slightly increased 
(from 7.2% to 8.6%) (Figure 19) (Euromonitor 
International 2013a).
Figure 19. Cigarette retail volumes according to price bands, 2002-
2012                                                                                                
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2013a) data
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Table 1. Volume sales of tobacco by category, 2002-2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Euromonitor International (2002-2012) and CMT (2013) data 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cigarettes (mn sticks) 97,101.8 99,790.8 98,869.3 95,776.6 93,084.5 93,244.6 94,424.5 85,959.7 76,399.6 58,287.9 52,390.8 47,508.3
Cigars (mn units) 1,006.4 1,056.9 1,139.6 1,127.1 1,040.5 1,157.6 1,185.2 1,236.6 1,612.4 1,797.8 2,089.0 2,329.6
HRT (tonnes) 1,235.7 1,801.6 2,601.6 3,179.2 3,197.2 3,196.4 4,338.3 5,750.4 5,669.9 4,893.1 6,307.2 6,929.8
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The Spanish tobacco market is relatively large 
on a global scale, and smoking prevalence is 
high. Cigarette sales have strongly decreased 
in recent years, while HRT sales have grown 
significantly. Tobacco manufacturers have 
responded to decreasing sales by lowering the 
prices of premium cigarettes. Cigarette prices 
are high on a global scale, but cigarettes are 
relatively affordable. 
• According to the Tobacconists Association, the size of 
the market of low-priced cigarettes (cigarettes below 
the minimum tax price of €4.10) doubled in the last 
two years, from a 4.8% share in 2012 to 9.4% at the 
end of 2013. This occurred despite the introduction 
of the double minimum excise duty which imposes 
higher taxation on cigarettes below the price-threshold 
of €4.10 (see Regulation, p.33). The brands whose 
shares grew significantly within the super-low price 
segment were Brooklyn (from 3.5% in 2012 to 16.9% 
in 2013), Mark 1 (from 3.7% to 8.6%) and Golden 
American (from 3.7% to 5.3%) (Unión de Estanqueros 
2014).
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In Spain, taxation on tobacco products has increased 
since 2005, and it is among the highest worldwide, 
both as tax incidence on the retail price and as 
monetary value per 1,000 sticks. The Canary Islands 
have a different taxation regime, which allows them to 
apply a lower level of taxation on tobacco. Controls on 
the tobacco supply chain are medium-low. Finally, the 
regulation of tobacco consumption and sales, and of 
tobacco marketing and promotion, is medium-high.  
REGULATION
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Government Action
Government expenditure on 
tobacco control not including 
the control on the ITTP per 
1,000 inhabitants (US$)
Source: WHO–Global Tobacco Epidemic
Tobacco Supply Control*
Composite indicator measuring 
the presence of specific policy 
measures in the country
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Tobacco Consumption and 
Sale Control*
Composite indicator measuring 
the presence of specific policy 
measures in the country
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Tobacco Marketing and 
Promotion*
Composite indicator measuring 
the presence of specific policy 
measures in the country
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Taxation
Tax as % of the final retail 
price 
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(2014)
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(2014)
* The indicator should not be interpreted as if a higher value is always better than a lower value. The objective is rather to synthetically 
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•• In the past decade, Spain has improved its 
regulations of tobacco control. 
• In 2010, Spain ranked 13th among 31 European 
countries (together with Denmark and the 
Netherlands) on the Tobacco Control Scale (TCS).2 
Between 2005 and 2010, Spain gained several positions 
on the TCS. Indeed, by improving its regulations on 
tobacco control, it rose from the 26th to the 13th position in 
this ranking (Joossens and Raw 2011, 8). 
•• Spanish regulations must comply with European 
standards and international treaty obligations.3
• Since 26 December 2005 and with Art.9 of Law 
28/2005, Spain has complied with the European 
Directive 2003/33/EC on the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products by forbidding their 
free distribution, promotion, sponsorship, or advertising.4
• European Commission Directive n°37 of 2001 
recommends the adoption of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions in the EU Member States 
concerning the maximum tar, nicotine and carbon 
monoxide yields of cigarettes, and the appearance 
of warnings regarding health information on unit 
packs of tobacco products (Official Journal of 
the European Communities 2001). Spain adopted 
this directive in 2002, with the Royal Decree 1079 
(modified by the Royal Decree 639/2010).5
 • Since 11 January 2005, Spain has been a Party to 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). In May 2014, the Government 
agreed to access the Protocol on Illicit Trade in 
Tobacco products (Europa Press 2014).6 In June 
2014, the Spanish Congress approved the Protocol 
and submitted it to the Spanish Senate (Congreso de 
los Diputados 2014; Senado 2014). 
•• Taxation on tobacco products in Spain is high 
both as tax incidence on the final retail price and 
as total tax per 1,000 sticks. 
 • In 2010, taxes represented 78.3% of the most sold 
brand retail price. Globally, this level is high. Indeed, 
Spain ranked 16th out of 181 countries (WHO 2011b). 
In January 2014, taxes represented 79.2% of the 
weighted average price (WAP) of a pack of cigarettes 
(European Commission 2013a). 
 • Cigarette tax incidence increased between 2005 
and 2006, rising from 72.5% of the TIRSP (Tax 
Included Retail Selling Price), to 78.1%, between 
2010 and 2011 (from 78.3% to 79.9% of the TIRSP) 
and between 2011 and 2012 (from 79.9% of TIRSP 
to 80.3% of the WAP) (Figure 20, p.36) (European 
Commission 2013a).7
2. In 2005 and 2007 the survey was repeated in 30 European 
countries (27 EU countries plus Switzerland, Iceland and 
Norway), in 2011 with 31 European countries (the 2007 sample 
plus Turkey).
3. The EU Commission Communication entitled “Stepping up the 
fight against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in 
tobacco products-A comprehensive EU Strategy” – of 6 June 2013 
and directed to the Council and European Parliament – outlines 
the nature and scale of the EU problem of illicit tobacco trade, 
focusing on the causes and proposing a EU strategy to fight it. 
4. Par.1 of Art.9 of Law 28/2005 states that ‘sponsoring tobacco 
products is prohibited, as well as all the advertising, and 
promotion of these products in all media and formats, including 
vending machines’. Par.2 of the same article provides that ‘the 
free distribution of products, goods or services with the direct 
or indirect aim of promoting tobacco products outside the legal 
network of tobacconists, is prohibited’. It is outside the network 
prohibits retail establishments snuff and timbre of the State, free 
distribution or promotional products, goods or services or any 
other action, the aim or direct or indirect, primary or secondary, 
is the promotion of a  product. Par.3 of Art.9 prohibits in all media 
the sponsorship of tobacco products broadcasting of programs 
or images, in which presenters, collaborators or guests appear 
smoking or mention/display, directly or indirectly, trademarks, 
trade names, logos or other issues associated with tobacco 
products’ (Official Journal of the European Communities 2003). 
5. Art.4 of the Royal Decree 1079 (as modified in 2010) states 
that the Ministry of Health shall verify, through laboratories, the 
level of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yields of cigarettes. 
Art.5 Par.2A provides that all packaging of tobacco products 
must carry a text health warning, which must occupy at least 
30% of the packaging.
6. Up to January 2014, only half of the European countries 
had signed the Protocol (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom).
7. In 2011, only eleven countries (Argentina, Spain, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Romania, Slovenia, 
Turkey) and one territory worldwide (West Bank and Gaza Strip) 
had increased tobacco taxes above 75% of the final retail price 
(WHO 2011b).
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• Specific excise per 1,000 cigarettes has also 
increased in the past 10 years, from €4.0 in 2004 
to €24.1 in January 2014. The highest increases 
were registered between 2005 and 2006 (+55%) 
and between 2011 and 2012 (+50%) (European 
Commission 2014a).
• In 2010, the tax per 1,000 sticks amounted to 
International $172.5, and Spain ranked 31st out of 164 
countries (WHO 2012). In 2013, the total taxes per 
1,000 sticks amounted to International $250.2.8
• Ad valorem excise remained stable between 
54% and 57% of TIRSP until 2011. In 2012, it was 
lowered to 55%, in 2013 to 53%, and lowered to 
51% in 2014 (European Commission 2014a).
•• In 2006, the Spanish Government introduced 
a Minimum Excise Tax (MET) on manufactured 
cigarettes. In 2009, the MET was extended to 
HRT. Finally, in 2013, the MET was imposed also 
on cigars and cigarillos  (European Commission 
2013b; López-Nicolás, Cobacho, and Fernández 
2013). 
 • In 2006, the MET was €55 per 1,000 manufactured 
cigarettes. This minimum tax was subsequently 
increased to €70 in November 2006, €91.3 in June 
2009, €116.9 in December 2010, €119.1 in 2012, and 
finally €128.7 in July 2013 (Figure 20) (European 
Commission 2013b). 
 • Additionally, in July 2013, a double Minimum Excise 
Duty was introduced on cigarettes. By complying 
with this provision, the total amount of taxes varies 
according to cigarette prices. Indeed, total taxes 
per pack of cigarettes below the price of €4.10, are 
€2.76 per pack (€138 per 1,000 cigarettes). Total 
taxes for packs of cigarettes equal to or above the 
price of €4.10, are €2.57 per pack (€128,65 per 1,000 
cigarettes) (BOE 2013).9
 • In 2009, the MET was imposed also on hand rolling 
tobacco. The minimum tax was initially €50/kg, it was 
raised to €75/kg in 2010, €80 in January 2013, and 
finally to €96.5 in July 2013 (European Commission 
2013b).
 • In January 2013, cigars and cigarillos were 
subjected to a minimum excise tax of €32.00/kg. This 
tax was raised to €41.50/kg in July 2013 (European 
Commission 2013b).
Figure 20. Cigarette Total Tax incidence as % of the Weighted 
Average Price and Tax Inclusive Retail Sale Price, 2001-2014                                  
Source: Transcrime elaboration on the European Commission - Directorate General Taxation 
and Customs Union Tax policy (2001-2014) data
 
•• Although the Canary Islands are part of Spain, 
they have a different taxation regime on tobacco. 
Taxes on tobacco products in the Canary Islands 
are nearly half the taxes on the Spanish mainland.
 • In Spain, all tobacco products must carry a duty-paid 
stamp. Indeed, complying with Law 13/1998, the 
retail of tobacco products in Spain’s mainland, the 
Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, is subject to state 
monopoly. However, this does not apply in the Canary 
Islands, where tobacco products have a different tax 
regime and a different fiscal stamp (Departamento de 
Economía, Servicio de Estudios 2012).
8. Transcrime calculations on the Excise Duty Tables-2013 
of the European Commission. Tax incidence as % of the final 
retail price and taxation per 1,000 sticks (tax level expressed 
in monetary terms) were calculated according to the most sold 
brand in 2013. Euro prices were converted into International $ 
through the International Monetary Fund conversion factor in 
2011.
9. In order to compute the minimum €4.10 price, Transcrime 
made the following calculations. The total amount of taxes per 
1,000 sticks may not be lower than €128.65 per 1,000 sticks 
(€2.57 per pack). The specific excise is €24 per 1,000 sticks 
(€0.48 per pack). By subtracting the specific excise from total 
taxes (€2.57-€0.48), the remaining quantity is 51% of the final 
retail price. The final retail price is €4,10. 
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 • In the Canary Islands VAT is not imposed on 
cigarettes; rather, there is a local consumer tax 
known as the IGIC (Impuesto General Indirecto 
de Canarias, Canary Islands General Indirect 
Tax). Moreover, the Tax on Retail Sales of Certain 
Hydrocarbons and some Special Taxes (specifically, 
the Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and the Special 
Tax on Tobacco Products) are not applied (European 
Commission 2014b; Ministry of the Finance and Public 
Administrations 2014)
 • In 2011, in the Canary Islands, the specific excise 
per 1,000 sticks was €6, while in Spain it was €12.7. 
Moreover, ad valorem excise and VAT/IGIC were 
around 36% in the Canary Islands and around 73% 
in Spain. In 2011, overall taxation on the final retail 
price was around 43% in the Canary Islands and 
80% in Spain (Campo Hernando 2011; European 
Commission 2011b).
•• Despite recent improvements in tobacco control, 
Spain has long been considered as scarcely active 
in tobacco control activities.
 • In 2006, the MAToC study (Measuring Activities in 
Tobacco Control) ranked Spain as one of the least 
active among the EU countries in terms of tobacco 
control. This study was developed on a questionnaire 
based on eleven topics such as: taxation, smuggling, 
product control, smoking cessation, media, protection 
from second hand smoke, health care, research, 
politics, population, and prevention. Various experts in 
the field of tobacco control filled in the questionnaires 
across the EU countries. Spain was the third least 
active country in tobacco control, after Greece 
and Germany (Thyrian and John 2006).
•• The Spanish Government has adopted several 
anti-tobacco measures since 2003.
 • In 2003, the Ministry of Health launched a National 
Programme for Tobacco Control (Programa 
Nacional de Control del Tabaco). The aim of the four-
year plan was to reduce youth smoking prevalence 
by 6%, and increase the number of ex-smokers by 
6%. No data concerning its actual impact are currently 
available (Saiz Martínez-Acitores et al. 2003)
 • Since 2005, several anti-smoking campaigns 
have been implemented in Spain at national level. 
Moreover, some anti-smoking campaigns, mounted 
by various anti-tobacco organisations, have targeted 
specific Spanish autonomous communities (Ministerio 
de la Sanidad 2014).
 • In 2008, Spain created an Observatory for Tobacco 
Prevention (Observatorio para la Prevención del 
Tabaquismo). It is under the Ministry of Health and 
has become a reference body at the national level in 
the fight against tobacco addiction. The Observatory 
monitors the degree of compliance with smoking 
prevention measures and tries to improve knowledge 
and actions on smoking prevention. Moreover, it 
promotes cooperation with the authorities of other 
countries, and with international organisations, for the 
implementation and development of tobacco control 
programmes (Ministry of Health, Social Services and 
Equality 2006; Ministry of Health and Consumption 
2006).
 • Spain joined the ‘Help-For a life without tobacco’, 
an EU anti-tobacco awareness campaign. It was 
launched by the European Union in 2005 with the 
aim of achieving prevention and smoking cessation, 
as well as a reduction in passive smoking (European 
Commission 2010c). Moreover, Spain joined the ‘Ex-
smokers are Unstoppable’ campaign, the three-year 
EU-wide campaign launched on 16 June 2011. It used 
a coordinated mix of advertising, social media, and 
events to reach smokers and help them to quit. 
• The National Committee for Smoking Prevention 
(CNPT, Comité Nacional para la Prevención 
del Tabaquismo) gathers smoking prevention 
organisations in Spain. It is also part of the European 
Network for Smoking Prevention, which groups similar 
coalitions of various EU countries (CNPT 2006).  
• There is no single hotline for smoking, but rather 
different hotlines: one in Andalusia, one in Barcelona 
and one in Madrid. Their aim is to inform citizens on 
how to quit smoking (AECC 2013).
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•• Spain has a medium-low level of supply chain 
control (2 points out of 5, Table 2).
•• The retail of tobacco in tobacconists is subject to 
‘licensing’. The retail of tobacco through vending 
machines requires an ‘authorisation’ from the CMT 
(Point 1 in Table 2).
• Art.4 of Law 13/1998 (as amended by Law 14/2013) 
mandates that the retail of tobacco in tobacconists is 
subject to licensing granted by an auction procedure. 
The auction is convened by the Ministry of Finance 
and Public Administration and the CMT. There is a 
limited number of licenses and they have a duration of 
25 years.
• On the other hand, it is not necessary to possess 
a licence in order to sell tobacco through vending 
machines. Rather, an authorisation from the CMT 
is sufficient. Interested parties submit a request 
to the CMT, which can reject the authorisation if 
the person making the request has personal or 
employment relationships with the tobacco market. 
The authorisation issued has a duration of three 
years. The law does not specify whether there is a 
limited number of authorisations issued (Art.4 of Law 
28/2005) (CMT 2014e).
• Despite these licensing and authorisation provisions, 
in 2013, the CMT discovered 1,786 cases of tobacco 
retailing without a licence and 1,102 cases of vending 
machines not equipped with opening keys for CMT 
inspections (Alonso Miranda 2014).10
•• The manufacture of tobacco products is not 
subject to licensing in Spain (Point 2 in Table 2).
 • Art.2 of Law 13/1998 (as amended by Law 25/2009) 
liberalised the tobacco market, removing the licence 
obligation for tobacco manufacturers, wholesalers 
and importers. In particular, the establishment of 
new manufacturers occurs prior to the submission by 
interested parties of a sworn statement and formal 
documents11 to the CMT. After 15 days from the 
notification, the person concerned is entitled to act in 
the tobacco market if the CMT does not intervene. 
•• Art. 8 of the Royal Decree 1199/1999 (as amended in 
2013) provides for a system of customer identification 
and verification (Point 3 in Table 2).
 • Tobacco manufacturers, importers and distributors 
are obliged to provide the CMT, upon request, with 
any documents, books and records with detailed 
information about the origin and destination of the 
tobacco products and the underlying transactions. 
However, this obligation occurs only upon request. 
Moreover, a mandatory system of customer 
identification and verification is provided by the 
EC agreements with the four major tobacco 
manufacturers. However, it does not bind all 
manufacturers; which may create loopholes in overall 
customer identification and verification.
Table 2. Spain’s regulations on supply chain control
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Supply chain control indicator Value
1) The retail of tobacco products is subject to licensing  1 point
2) The manufacture of tobacco products is subject to licensing 0 points
3) There is a mandatory system of customer identification and verification applied to the supply chain of tobacco products 0.5 points
4) There is a tracking and tracing system for tobacco products 0.5 points
5) Absence of free-trade zones for tobacco products 0 point
Note: the indicator should not be interpreted as if a higher value is always better than a lower value. The objective is rather to 
synthetically assess the intensity of policy measures in a specific field.
11. For manufacturers, these formal documents comprise 
detailed plans of the stores and a specification of the future 
work, including forecasts of fabrication volume. For importers, 
they comprise detailed plans of the stores and a document 
indicating the future supplier of tobacco products (the 
manufacturer or wholesaler). For wholesalers, they comprise 
detailed plans of the available facilities (with the property or rent 
contract) (CMT 2014f).
Regulation
10. According to Art.25 Par.2 of the Royal Decree 1199/1999 
(as amended by Royal Decree 1676/2011), the owners of 
vending machines must provide the means to open the vending 
machines in the case of inspection by the officials of the CMT.
39
The factbook on the illicit trade in tobacco products   S
PA
IN
•• An effective tracking and tracing system has not 
yet been applied in Spain (Point 4 in Table 2, p.38).
• A mandatory system of tracking and tracing is 
provided by the agreements stipulated by the EU 
Commission with PMI (2004), JTI (2007), IT and BAT 
(both 2010) (European Commission 2004; 2007; 
2010b; 2010a). Nevertheless, these agreements 
have not been signed by smaller tobacco 
manufacturers, which are not obliged to comply 
with these measures.12
 • Spain has not yet signed the Protocol to Eliminate 
the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. However, 
the European Union signed it on 20 December 
2013, demonstrating its commitment to the future 
implementation of the Protocol and of a tracking and 
tracing system (Art.8).
•• There are three free-trade zones in Spain (Point 5 
in Table 2, p.38).
 • In Spain there are several FTZs: Vigo, Barcelona, 
Cádiz and Grand Canaria. However, only the port of 
Barcelona has been identified as receiving Chinese 
counterfeit products bound for Western Europe 
(BASCAP 2012). 
 • Spain also has some ‘bonded warehouses’ in 
Algeciras, Alicante, Bilbao, Cartagena, Gijon, A 
Coruña, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Madrid Airport, 
Malaga, Pasajes, Santander, Tarragona, Valencia, 
Burgos and Zaragoza (Espinar 2014). ‘Bonded 
warehouses’ are secured areas in which goods may 
be stored or manipulated with more simplified or 
reduced customs formalities (AEAT 2014a).
•• The regulation of tobacco consumption and sales 
is medium-high in Spain (4 points out of 5, Table 3).
•• Smoking bans are in place in Spain (Points 1, 2 
and 5 in Table 3).
 • The new anti-tobacco legislation (Law 42/2010), 
modifying Art.7 of Law 28/2005, completely bans 
smoking in all public places. Violators caught 
smoking in designated non-smoking areas are fined 
with €30-600, and the owner of premises from €601 to 
€10,000.
 • Previously, Art.7 of Law 28/2005 banned 
smoking in most public places (workplaces, public 
institutions, healthcare and education facilities, 
shopping centres, cultural and leisure places, 
foodservices establishments, elevators and public 
transport vehicles). However, it allowed smoking in 
restaurants and bars according to the size of their 
premises. Premises with a surface area of less than 
100 sq. metres were not required to create a separate 
area for smokers, and the owners could decide 
whether they wanted to declare them smoking or non-
smoking establishments (Euromonitor International 
2012).
12. The mandatory system of customer identification and 
verification provides that tobacco producers conduct their 
business relations with the ‘due licence’ and report to the 
competent authorities if customers are engaged in activities 
in contravention of the obligations arising from the Protocol. 
They must also ensure that quantities of tobacco products are 
commensurate with the demand for such products. Tracking 
and tracing systems (codes, signs and stamps) are helpful for 
monitoring and tracing or, put more simply, for reconstructing the 
path of tobacco products in the supply chain.
Table 3. Regulation of tobacco consumption and sales in Spain 
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
Tobacco consumption and sales indicator Value
1) Ban on smoking in public places 1 point
2) Ban on smoking in workplaces 1 point
3) Ban on the sale of tobacco products from vending machines 0 points
4) Prohibition of tobacco sales to minors 1 point
5) Ban on smoking in bars, cafés and restaurants 1 point
Note: the indicator should not be interpreted as if a higher value is always better than a lower value. The objective is rather to 
synthetically assess the intensity of policy measures in a specific field.
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•• The sale of tobacco products through vending 
machines is allowed in Spain (Laws 28/2005 and 
42/2010) (Point 3 in Table 3, p.39).
 • Under Law 28/2005 only restaurants and kiosks 
were allowed to sell tobacco products through 
vending machines. However, Law 42/2010 allows 
vending machines also in convenience stores and 
at petrol stations (Art.4). Vending machines must 
have adequate devices to prevent access to minors 
(younger than 18) (Resolution 16822 of 20 September 
2006).
 • Cigarettes sold through vending machines are 
subject to a higher price. Indeed, they cost + €0.15 
per pack (CMT 2014d). 
•• The sale of tobacco products to minors is banned 
(Point 3 and 4 in Table 3, p.39).
 • Art.3 Par.2 of Law 28/2005 set the legal smoking age 
at 18 years. The sale of tobacco to minors incurs a 
fine of between €601 and €10,000 (Art.20 Par.1 of 
Law 28/2005).
•• The regulation of tobacco marketing and 
promotion is medium-high in Spain (4 points out 
of 5, Table 4).
•• Tobacco advertising through any media channel is 
banned (Euromonitor International 2012) (Points 1 
and 2 in Table 4).
 • Since 26 December 2005, with Law 309/2005 (Art.9 
Par1), all forms of advertising, free distribution, 
promotion and sponsorship of tobacco products 
have been forbidden. With this law, Spain 
implemented the European Directive 2003/33/EC.
•• In Spain there is no ban on the display of 
tobacco products at points of sale. It is allowed 
in tobacconists (Euromonitor International 2012) 
(Point 3 in Table 4).
•• The free distribution of tobacco samples is 
banned in Spain (Point 4 in Table 4).
 • Art.9 Par.2 of  Law 28/2005 provides that ‘prohibited, 
outside the network of tobacconists, is the free or 
promotional distribution of products, goods or services 
or, with the direct or indirect aim of promoting tobacco 
products’.
•• Pictorial health warnings on tobacco products are 
mandatory (Point 5 in Table 4).
 • Art.5 Par.2A of the Royal Decree 1079 (modified by 
Royal Decree 639/2010) provides that all packaging 
of tobacco products must carry a text health warning, 
which must occupy at least 30% of the packaging. 
In 2010, Art.5 was integrated with Par.2B, which 
established that every pack of cigarettes must also 
have pictorial health warnings.
In conclusion, the taxation on cigarettes is high 
both as tax incidence on the final retail price 
and as total tax per 1,000 sticks. However, the 
Canary Islands, which are part of Spain, levy 
lower taxation on tobacco products. Control 
of the tobacco supply chain is medium-low. 
Finally, the regulation of tobacco consumption 
and sales, and of marketing and promotion, is 
medium-high.
Table 4. Regulation of tobacco marketing and promotion in Spain 
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
Tobacco marketing and promotion indicator Value
1) Ban on tobacco sponsorship and advertising in radio, TV broadcasts and print media  1 point
2) Ban on billboards and outdoor advertising 1 point
3) Ban on the display of tobacco products at points of sale 0 points
4) Ban on free distribution of tobacco samples  1 point
5) Mandatory pictorial health warnings 1 point
Note: the indicator should not be interpreted as if a higher value is always better than a lower value. The objective is rather to 
synthetically assess the intensity of policy measures in a specific field. 
Regulation
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Spain has recorded a decrease in crime rates in 
recent years. However, drug consumption is very high 
for cannabis and cocaine and medium for opioids. 
There is a medium presence of organised crime 
activities, and the shadow economy is medium-low in 
extent. Corruption is an emerging issue.
CRIME ENVIRONMENT 
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CRIME TRENDS 
•• Crime rates have recorded a decrease in recent 
years.  
• Crime figures show a downward trend in violent 
crimes between 2005 and 2008. Homicides, 
assaults, sexual violence, robberies, burglaries, 
thefts and motor vehicle thefts recorded a significant 
decrease. In particular, assaults and thefts decreased 
the most (-90.1%, and -78.8% respectively) (UNODC 
2012a).  
• All property crimes have decreased since 2003. 
Burglaries have decreased by approximately 60%, 
robberies by 23%, thefts by 79%,and motor vehicle 
thefts by 54% (UNODC 2012a). The data of the 
Ministry of Interior reveal that robberies and thefts 
decreased also between 2012 and 2013 (-10.9% and 
-2.9% respectively) (Ministerio del Interior 2014).
• According to official statistics, the number of crimes 
decreased by approximately 4% between 2012 and 
2013. Moreover, the crime rate decreased from 48.0 
crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2012, to 46.1 in 2013 
(Ministerio del Interior 2014).
• Spain ranks 170th out of 188 countries for homicide 
rate. Homicides increased between 1996 and 2003 
and then decreased, reaching the value of 0.8 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012 (UNODC 
2012a). This value is below the European average 
(2.3) (Figure 21) (UNODC 2011; 2013a). According 
to official data, between 2012 and 2013 the number 
of homicides decreased by about 17% and the 
homicides rate diminished from 0.8 homicides per 
1,000 inhabitants to 0.6 (Ministerio del Interior 2014). 
Figure 21. Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, Spain and Europe, 
1995-2012 13                                                                                     
Source: Transcrime elaboration on UNODC (2012a) data
 
• According to the International Crime Victims Survey 
(ICVS), in 2004-2005, 33% of Spaniards felt 
unsafe walking alone at night. Moreover, 26% of 
respondents thought that their homes were likely to be 
burgled in the next year (van Dijk, van Kesteren, and 
Smit 2007).
 • In Spain, the problems of security and 
delinquency are not among the main concerns of 
Spanish people (Barberet 2005). Indeed, according 
to a survey conducted in January 2014, only 2.3% of 
respondents thought that security and delinquency 
were among Spain’s three main problems (CIS 2014). 
DRUG CONSUMPTION AND 
MARKETS
•• Drug consumption is high for cannabis and 
cocaine, and medium for opioids (Figure 22, p. 44).
 • Cannabis is the most frequently used drug. 
Moreover, compared with other countries, the 
prevalence of cannabis use is higher. Indeed, 
Spain ranks 10th out of 120 countries, with a 9.6% 
prevalence in 2011 (UNODC 2013b). 
 • Cocaine consumption is high and the country ranks 
1st out of 92 countries. 2.3% of adults reported 
having consumed cocaine in 2011 (UNODC 2013b).
13. The value is calculated for the countries that the UNODC 
classifies as ‘Europe’.
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Figure 22. Prevalence of drug use in Spain, last available year                           
Source: Transcrime elaboration on UNODC-World Drug Report (2013b) data
 • The prevalence of opioids’ use is medium. Spain 
ranks 65th out of 133 countries, with a prevalence of 
0.3% (UNODC 2013b).
 • The prevalence of amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS) is medium compared to other European 
countries. 0.7% of adults reported having consumed 
amphetamines in 2011 (UNODC 2013b). 
 • According to the most recent EDADES14 Survey, 
drug use has decreased in recent years. Indeed, the 
percentage of the population who reported having 
used cannabis in the past 12 months decreased 
by about 15 p.p. from 2003, reaching 9.6% of the 
population in 2011. The number of cocaine users, 
after increasing until 2007, started to decrease, from 
6.6% of the population in 2007 to 4.7% in 2011. Also 
the number of ecstasy and amphetamines consumers 
has decreased in recent years (about -7% and -25% 
respectively, between 2003 and 2011). Hallucinogens 
and heroin consumers have remained stable during 
this period (Figure 23) (Ministerio de la Sanidad 
2012).
 • The only drug whose consumption increased between 
2005 and 2011 is tranquilisers (Figure 23). The 
prevalence rose from 4.8% of the population in 2007 
to 10.7% in 2011, with a strong increase, related to the 
increase in hypnosedatives (Ministerio de la Sanidad 
2012).
Figure 23. Prevalence of drug use in Spain, 2001-2011
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Ministry of health (2012) data
 • In regard to consumption in the previous 12 months, 
drug use in Spain is most widespread among 
individuals in the 15-34 age group. The exceptions are 
sleeping pills and tranquilisers, which record a higher 
percentage of users in the 35-64 age group (Ministerio 
de la Sanidad 2012).
•• Drug seizures have exhibited a decreasing trend 
since 2004 (Figure 24, p.45).
 • Spain is a destination and transit country from 
North Africa to Western Europe. For example, 
hashish enters Spain from Morocco. Moreover, Spain 
is considered to be one of the main entry points for 
cocaine bound for the European drug market (Frontex 
2013).
 • Seizures of hashish decreased by about 52% between 
2008 and 2012. Seizures of cocaine decreased by 
about 26%. Seizures of ecstasy and heroin also 
decreased (-67%, and -58% respectively) (Ministerio 
de la Sanidad 2012).
14. The Household Survey on Alcohol and Drugs in Spain 
(Encuesta Domiciliaria sobre Alcohol y Drogas en España) is a 
biennial program of survey on drug use (population 15-64 years), 
promoted by the Government Delegation for the National Plan 
on Drugs in collaboration with the Autonomous Communities.
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Figure 24. Seizures of drugs, 2002-2011                                                                              
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Ministry of Health (2012) data
ORGANISED CRIME AND 
CORRUPTION
•• Spain has a medium presence of organised crime 
groups.
 • The country ranks medium on the Composite 
Organized Crime Index, scoring 30.8 and occupying 
89th place among 156 countries (van Dijk 2008). In 
2012, the Security Forces of the State investigated 
482 organised crime groups and dismantled 277 
groups (Hierro 2013). 
 • According to the Secretary of State for Security, 
Francisco Martinez, there are three types of organised 
crime groups in Spain. The first are the ‘high 
intensity’ ones, which are complex international 
infrastructures that can generate significant economic 
benefits and have a high capacity to infiltrate social 
institutions; the second are ‘typical’ groups, with 
a good degree of organisation. These can become 
high-intensity groups if they operate for a long period 
of time. The third are ‘low intensity’ groups with little 
economic capacity (Hierro 2013). 
 • The Ministry of Justice analyses data on organised 
crime prosecutions. According to these data, 
organised crime is present in Asturias, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, the Canary Islands, the Community 
of Madrid, the Region of Murcia, the Basque 
Country, the Valencian Community, Aragón (only in 
Zaragoza) and Andalusia (only in Huelva and Cádiz) 
(Torres-Dulce Lifante 2012).
 • Organised criminal groups are involved in various 
activities: drug trafficking (in Aragon, Asturias, 
Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Extremadura and 
Andalusia), property crimes (in Asturias and the 
Region of Murcia), human trafficking (in Catalonia 
and Basque Country), exploitation of prostitution (in 
Catalonia, Extremadura and Basque Country), fraud 
and intellectual property crimes (in the Community 
of Madrid) and crimes against public health (in the 
Valencian Community) (Torres-Dulce Lifante 2012).
 • The situation in the Basque Country is 
different from that in other regions due to the 
presence of the organised group ETA (Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and 
Freedom). This paramilitary group is a Basque 
nationalist and separatist organisation established in 
1959. Since 1968, ETA has been held responsible for 
a high number of homicides, injuries and kidnappings. 
This group declared several ceasefires (1989, 1996, 
1998 and 2006) and subsequently broke them. 
However, on 5 September 2010, ETA declared a new 
ceasefire that is still in force and on 20 October 2011, 
it announced the definitive cessation of its armed 
activity (BBC 2010; 2011; 2012; Torres-Dulce Lifante 
2012). 
•• Corruption is medium-low in comparison with the 
global average, but high if compared with most EU 
Member States.
 • In 2013, Spain scored 59 on the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), and was the 40th country 
out of the 177 countries surveyed. However, 
corruption perception is increasing in Spain. Between 
2008 and 2009, the country passed from 28th to 32nd 
position among 177 countries. Then the CPI remained 
stable between 2009 and 2012 and decreased 
again in 2013, when Spain ranked in 40th position 
(Transparency International 2013a). 
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 • The Global Corruption Barometer surveyed 
114,000 respondents in 107 countries, measuring the 
number of people who reported having paid bribes 
in the past year to various services and institutions.15 
In this survey, a relatively low number of Spanish 
respondents stated that they had paid a bribe in the 
previous 12 months (3%) (Transparency International 
2013b).
 • However, the perception of corruption has 
increased (European Commission 2014c; GRECO 
2014). According to national surveys, in 2011 46.8% 
of respondents considered corruption to be very 
widespread and 39.8% thought that it was quite 
widespread. Only 0.4% of respondents believed 
there is no corruption among Spanish politicians. A 
2014 survey found that Spanish people perceive 
corruption to be the second biggest issue for Spanish 
society after the economic crisis (CIS 2014; European 
Commission 2014d)
 • In February 2014, the European Commission 
invited Spain to improve its regulations against 
corruption. It made a series of suggestions for 
the Spanish government, principally improvement 
of the law on the funding of political parties and on 
transparency, and increased controls at national and 
regional level (European Commission 2014c; 2014d).
•• Spain has a medium-low level of shadow economy 
compared with other EU Member States.
 • According to a study on shadow economies over 
the period 1999-2007, Spain ranked 41st out of 162 
countries, with a value of 22.2 (Schneider, Buehn 
and Montenegro 2010). In recent years, the shadow 
economy has decreased (19.2 in 2012). 
 • However, according to a national study, the shadow 
economy in Spain has increased in recent years, but 
this growth has been combined with an increase in 
official economic activity (Funcas 2010; Ureta 2013).  
Spain has recorded a decrease in crime rates 
in recent years, and the shadow economy is 
medium–low in its extent. However, corruption 
exhibits an increasing trend. Drug consumption 
is high and drug seizures have decreased in 
recent years. There is a medium presence 
of organised crime activities centred on 
drug trafficking, property crimes and human 
trafficking. 
15. The services and institutions included were: education 
system, judiciary, medical and health services, police, registry 
and permit services, utilities, tax and/or customs, and land 
services.
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Since 2011, Spain has implemented two awareness 
campaigns against the ITTP. Law enforcement 
agencies and the Spanish Customs have stipulated 
cooperation agreements with foreign customs and law 
enforcement agencies to tackle tobacco smuggling. 
The average penalty for tobacco contraband is 
low: imprisonment for between 0 and 2 years. In 
conclusion, anti-ITTP action is medium-low in Spain 
owing to the absence of official estimates on, and a 
national action plan against, the ITTP. 
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assess the intensity of policy measures in a specific field.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SPAIN
• Spain had 389.9 police personnel per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2011. This figure is relatively high on a 
global scale; indeed, the country ranked 26th out of 
87 countries worldwide with available data (UNODC 
2012a).
• The rate of judges per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 
was 10.5. Spain ranked 38th out of 75 countries. 
The rate has increased since 2005, when it was 9.9 
(UNODC 2012b).
• In 2010, the total number of persons held in 
prisons, penal or correctional institutions per 100,000 
inhabitants was 160.4. This rate corresponds to a total 
amount of 73,929 detained persons. In 2010, Spain 
ranked 46th out of 110 countries in terms of prison 
population (UNODC 2012b).
• According to the International Centre for Prison 
Studies’ classification, Spain ranked 108th out of 221 
countries surveyed in 2012 for prison population, 
with a rate of 143.0 detained persons per 100,000 
inhabitants (ICPS 2013). More than half of the 
countries in the world have a prison population rate 
below 150.0 per 100,000 inhabitants (Walmsley 2011). 
Regardless of the estimate chosen, Spain has an 
average-sized prison population.
THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ITTP IN SPAIN
•• The main bodies involved in the fight against the 
ITTP are:
• The Cuerpo Nacional de Policia (National Police 
Force) and the Cuerpo de Guardia Civil (Civil 
Guard). They monitor ports, airports, coasts, borders, 
and customs, control emigration and immigration, and 
suppress state fraud and smuggling.16
• The Agencia Tributaria-Aduanas e Impuestos 
Especiales (AEAT, Tax Agency- Customs and 
Special Taxes). It controls and guarantees the 
correct application of the tax and customs system. 
In particular, it collaborates in the prosecution of 
offences against the Public Treasury, including 
smuggling and money laundering (AEAT 2012). In 
regard to smuggling, the AEAT carries out surveillance 
and control actions in the Spanish maritime and 
air space in coordination with other state bodies. 
During 2012, its priority was the fight against tobacco 
smuggling (AEAT 2012).
•• The Spanish law enforcement agencies cooperate 
with European institutions to tackle the ITTP.
• The Cuerpo Nacional de Policia (National Police 
Force), the Dirección Adjunta de Vigilancia Aduanera 
(Customs Surveillance Directorate) and the Cuerpo 
de la Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) are the Spanish 
agencies that cooperate with European Institutions 
through Europol and Interpol to investigate and 
tackle, among other crimes, tobacco smuggling 
(Europol 2014).
• Europol17 supports national law enforcement 
agencies in the fight against the illegal manufacturing 
and distribution of tobacco products, which annually 
cost the EU about €10 bn in lost revenues (Europol 
2011).
• Interpol is the world’s largest international police 
organisation. Among other tasks, Interpol works to 
identify, disrupt and dismantle transnational organised 
trafficking networks. This trafficking comprises 
counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling of legitimate 
products (Interpol 2013).
16. Law n°2/86 of March 13, on state law enforcement agencies 
in Spain (Ley Orgánica 2/86,de 13 de Marzo, de Fuerzas y 
Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado)
17. On 11 July 2013 – on the occasion of the Law Enforcement 
Working Party of the Council of the EU – a proposal on the 
regulation of Europol was submitted to the European Parliament 
and Council for the EU in order to assist it in collecting and 
analysing criminal intelligence information and in exchanging 
the results of such analyses with the EU Member States, and 
to ensure more effective Europol support for national police 
forces. It was also proposed to merge Europol and Cepol. Both 
proposals received little support from Member States and the 
European Parliament. 
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• Spain signed Schengen agreements in 1991. By 
complying with these agreements, Spain undertook 
to accelerate police cooperation by exchanging 
information needed to combat crime, as well as 
information in the field of crime prevention (Europa.eu 
2009).
• OLAF (French acronym for Office de Lutte Anti-
Fraude) provides assistance in the organisation of 
joint consultations with law enforcement institutions 
in various EU countries on investigations including 
tobacco smuggling. The Spanish Customs 
cooperates actively with OLAF. For example, 
Operation ‘BALMAN’ in 2010, conducted jointly by the 
Spanish Customs and OLAF, dismantled a criminal 
organisation importing tobacco from China to ports on 
the eastern coast of Spain.
•• Spanish Law enforcement and Customs cooperate 
actively with foreign law enforcement authorities, 
both in Europe and outside Europe. However, 
cooperation with Andorra and Gibraltar could be 
improved (Dopico Martinez 2014).
• The Cuerpo Nacional de Policia and the Guardia 
Civil actively collaborate with foreign police forces 
to perform their security tasks.18 However, in some 
cases, cooperation could be further improved. Indeed, 
neither Andorra, nor Gibraltar furnish full cooperation 
in the fight against tobacco smuggling (Dopico 
Martinez 2014).
• The AEAT provides assistance, collaboration and 
promotes cooperation activities with other Member 
States or third countries to prevent tax evasion (AEAT 
2012).
• The Guardia Civil and the AEAT collaborate and 
exchange information with Andorran and Gibraltarian 
authorities with the aim of combating tobacco 
smuggling (Alonso Miranda 2014).
• The Spanish Customs have signed bilateral19 and 
multilateral20 agreements with countries, both in the 
EU and outside the EU, on cooperation and mutual 
assistance in customs matters. The purpose of these 
agreements is to facilitate the exchange of information 
in the fight against fraud (AEAT 2013a). 
• The Spanish Customs collaborates in various 
programmes for customs modernisation. In particular, 
since 2002, the Spanish Customs has engaged in 
eleven twinning programmes with European customs 
(three in Hungary, two in Romania, two in Bulgaria, 
two in Estonia, and two in Croatia) (AEAT 2013a).
• The Spanish Criminal Code and the Trademarks 
Law are the main normative provisions on tobacco 
smuggling and counterfeiting in Spain. Overall, 
criminal penalties in a serious ITTP case seem to be 
severe (see box Hypothetical case, pp.51 and 52).  
18. Law n°2/86 of March 13, on state law enforcement agencies 
in Spain (Ley Orgánica 2/86,de 13 de Marzo, de Fuerzas y 
Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado)
19. Bilateral agreements have been signed between Spain and: 
Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Cuba, USA, France, Italy, Morocco, 
Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Russia, Turkey (AEAT 
2013a).
20. Agreement between the National Customs of Latin America, 
Spain and Portugal on cooperation and mutual assistance 
(AEAT 2013a).
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HYPOTHETICAL CASE 
A criminal organisation composed of eleven members used a house in the periphery of a large city as an illicit 
factory for the production and distribution of tobacco products. For at least sixteen months, with a clear division 
of tasks and functions among them, the members of the organisation illegally manufactured tobacco products 
(cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco); packed them in packaging bearing false trademarks of legitimate brands 
(produced by the same organisation); distributed the products to various wholesalers and retailers; and sold the 
illicit products through a network of bars and street sellers. No tax or duty was ever paid on these products. The law 
enforcement seized a total of ten tonnes of illegal tobacco products stocked inside the house. All the members of 
the organisation had previous convictions for fraud, forgery and illicit trade in tobacco products. The members could 
not justify their incomes through any form of employment, suggesting that the illicit business was their sole source 
of income.
The applicable penalties in Spain
According to Spanish law, the above-described activities constitute criminal offences in the following areas:
1. Revenue Offences
 a) Tax evasion on a large scale
 b) Counterfeiting tax stamps
2. IP infringement
3. Membership of a criminal organisation
4. Money laundering
According to Art. 28 of the Spanish Criminal Code, in the case of joint commission of a criminal offence, each 
offender is liable as a principal. All members of the group are fully liable, even if some members of the group 
may have given orders and others may have executed them, as long as all members acted in pursuit of shared 
objectives.
1. Revenue Offences
a) Tax evasion on a large scale
According to Art. 305 bis of the Criminal Code, the members of a criminal organisation committing tax 
fraud shall be sentenced to an imprisonment from 2 to 6 years and a fine from 2 to 6 times the amount of 
evaded tax. 
b) Counterfeiting tax stamps
According to Art. 389 of the Criminal Code, persons who forge tax stamps or import them to Spain in 
awareness that they have been forged shall be sentenced to imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years. 
2. IP infringement
The use of a trademark on packaging material and its distribution without the consent of the trademark holder is 
a criminal offence under Art. 274.1 of the Criminal Code. Since the perpetrators belong to a criminal organisation 
(Art. 276 c), imprisonment from 1 to 4 years, a fine from 12 to 24 months of daily payments and prohibition from 
undertaking the profession related to the committed offence are imposed.  
Pursuant to articles 109 and 116 of the Criminal Code and Art. 43 of the Trademarks Law, the perpetrators shall 
redeem the losses (damnum emergens and lucrum cessans) caused by the offence to the aggrieved party. 
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3. Membership of a criminal organisation
According to Art. 570 bis of the Criminal Code, those members who promote, constitute, organise, co-ordinate 
or direct a criminal organisation may be sentenced to imprisonment for 4 to 8 years. The other members of the 
organisation may be sentenced to imprisonment for 2 to 5 years.
This legal qualification may not be applied if the fact of being member of a criminal organisation has already been 
taken into account when other penalties  have been imposed. 
4. Money laundering
According to Art. 301 of the Criminal Code, the offence of money laundering is committed when a person acquires, 
possesses, uses, converts or transmits assets originating from an illicit activity. The penalties to be imposed for the 
commission of such an offence are imprisonment from 6 months to 6 years and a fine from 1 to 3 times the value 
of the seized goods. Should the crime be committed by a criminal organisation, a punishment not lower than the 
upper half of the applicable penalty shall be imposed (Art. 301.1).
Ruling on the penalties 
Articles. 66.3 and 74.1 of the Criminal Code are considered In order to determine the punishment applicable to the 
individuals involved in this hypothetical case. 
Previous criminal records with regard to the particular offences are taken into consideration (Art. 22.8 of the 
Criminal Code). Should one or more aggravating circumstance occur, the penalty (in its upper half) is imposed (Art. 
66.3).
Moreover, according to Art. 74.1 of the Criminal Code, ‘whoever perpetrates multiple actions or omissions in the 
execution of a preconceived plan that offends one or several subjects and infringes the same criminal provision 
or provisions that are of equivalent of similar nature shall be punished as the principal of a continued felony or 
misdemeanour with the punishment stated for the most serious offence, which shall be imposed either in its upper 
half, or in the lower half of the higher degree of punishment’.
Applicable penalty21
Two options concern the penalties that may be applied to perpetrators.
1. The first is applied when the most serious offense is considered to be performed by those “promoting, 
constituting, organising, coordinating or leading a criminal organisation” (Art. 570 bis, Criminal code). In this case, 
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is not applied. The penalty is thus established in accordance with Art. 
74.1 on continued felony (see above). Therefore, those who promote, constitute, organise, co-ordinate or direct 
a criminal organisation (Art. 570 bis), may be sentenced to imprisonment for between 4 and 8 years. This penalty 
is imposed in its upper half in compliance with Art. 74.1. The final imposable penalty is imprisonment from 6 to 8 
years.
2. The second option, when the most serious offence is “tax evasion on a large scale committed by a criminal 
organisation” (Art. 305 bis, Criminal Code). In this case, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is applied 
(Art. 66.3) as well as that of continued felony (Art. 74). Tax evasion on a large scale committed by a criminal 
organisation (Art. 305 bis) may incur imprisonment for 2 to 6 years and a fine calculated as 2 to 6 times the amount 
of tax evaded. This penalty is imposed in its upper half in accordance with Art. 66.3 and then imposed in its upper 
half in accordance with Art. 74.1. The final imposable penalty is 5 to 6 years of imprisonment. Moreover, Art. 305 
bis mandates a pecuniary fine 2 to 6 times the amount of tax evaded. Therefore, after the Court has determined the 
quantity of tax evaded, this is added to the imposable punishment (Mir Puig 2006; Faraldo Cabana 2012).
21. Valuable sources for construction of this hypothetical case study have been: Santiago Mir Puig, Derecho Penal-parte general, 
7a, Ediciόn, Editorial Reppertor, Barcelona, 2006; Patricia Faraldo Cabana, Asociaciones ilícitas y organizaciones criminales en 
el código penal español, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2012.
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•• The number of arrests for tobacco smuggling 
increased by 800% between 2007 and 2012 (Figure 
25).
• The annual number of arrests for tobacco smuggling 
increased between 2007 and 2012, from 6 to 54 
arrests (INE 2014b).
• Between 2010 and 2012, a penalty of 0-2 years 
imprisonment was imposed on offenders in 93% of 
the prosecuted cases for tobacco contraband (INE 
2014b).
• In 2013, the CMT discovered  1,786 cases of tobacco 
retail without a licence and 1,102 cases of vending 
machines not equipped with keys for CMT inspections 
(Alonso Miranda 2014).
Figure 25. Number of convictions for tobacco smuggling (Ley de 
Represión del Contrabando), 2007-2012                                                             
Source: Transcrime elaboration on INE (2014b) data
•• Anti-ITTP action in Spain is medium-low (2 points 
out of 5) (Table 5).
•• There is no national action plan against the ITTP 
in Spain (Point 1 in Table 5).
• However, several anti-smuggling operations have 
been mounted throughout Spain. Between March 
and October 2013, the Guardia Civil launched 
‘Operación Meta 1’, in collaboration with the CMT 
and the Spanish Tobacconists’ Association. The 
operation focused on the inspection of legal 
premises and street kiosks selling tobacco during 
public events around the country (Espinar 2014).
National public bodies and major tobacco companies 
have signed specific agreements to prevent and 
control the ITTP at the European level (Point 2 in 
Table 5).
• The European Commission has signed legally 
binding and enforceable agreements with the four 
largest tobacco manufacturers (PMI, JTI, BAT and 
IT). The latter have pledged to finance the EU and the 
countries signatory to the agreement in preventing 
their products from falling into the hands of illicit 
traffickers; to supply only the quantities of tobacco 
required by the legitimate market; and to ensure 
that they sell only to legal clients by implementing a 
tracking and tracing system (European Commission 
2004; 2007; 2010a; 2010b). However, these 
agreements legally bind only the four major tobacco 
manufacturers, not the other smaller ones.22
Table 5. Measures against the ITTP in Spain
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Anti-ITTP action indicator Value
1) National Action Plan against the ITTP 0 points
2) Cooperation agreements between national public bodies and tobacco companies to prevent and control the ITTP 0.5 points
3) National public awareness campaign against the various forms of the ITTP 1 point
4) Legal duty for tobacco manufacturers not to facilitate smuggling 0.5 points
5) Official estimates of the size of the ITTP 0 points
Note: the indicator should not be interpreted as if a higher value is always better than a lower value. The objective is rather to 
synthetically assess the intensity of policy measures in a specific field.  
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22. The mandatory system of customer identification and 
verification provides that tobacco producers conduct their 
business relations with the ‘due license’ and report to the 
competent authorities if customers are engaged in activities 
in contravention of the obligations arising from the Protocol. 
They must also ensure that quantities of tobacco products are 
commensurate with the demand for such products. Tracking 
and tracing systems (codes, signs and stamps) are helpful for 
monitoring and tracing or, put more simply, for reconstructing the 
path of tobacco products in the supply chain.
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•• In 2013, the Mesa del Tabaco launched an 
awareness campaign on the ITTP (Point 3 in Table 
5, p.53).
• In late 2013, the ‘Mesa del Tabaco’ (‘Tobacco 
Roundtable’) launched an awareness campaign 
called ‘Stop Contrabando de Tabaco’ (‘Stop tobacco 
contraband’), also known by its slogan “A mi me 
importa”, with the aim of raising public awareness 
on illicit tobacco and its harmful consequences for 
Spanish society. The campaign was publicized in the 
press, outdoor billboards and on the radio. The pilot 
campaign was launched in Andalusia, where illicit 
tobacco consumption is higher and where 91% of 
tobacco retailers reported a drop in sales between 
2012 and 2013 (Europa Press 2013c).
•• In Spain there is no legal obligation on tobacco 
manufacturers not to facilitate smuggling (Point 
4 in Table 5, p.53). However, some provisions on 
tobacco supply chain control are present.
• Royal Decree 1199/1999 (as amended in 2013) 
obliges tobacco manufacturers, importers and 
distributors to provide the CMT, upon request, 
with any documents, books and records containing 
detailed information about the origin and destination of 
tobacco products and the underlying transactions.
• In compliance with the above-mentioned EC 
agreements (see Point 2 in Table 5, p.53), the four 
major tobacco companies undertake to eliminate 
the ITTP on the EU’s territory and to assist law 
enforcement agencies (European Commission 2004; 
2007; 2010a; 2010b).
•• There are no publicly available official estimates 
on the size of the ITTP in Spain (Point 5 in Table 5, 
p. 53).
• Spanish institutions do not provide publicly available 
estimates of the illicit tobacco market.
•• Seizures of cigarettes have exhibited an unstable 
trend since 2001, with a peak in 2007.
• According to AEAT’s annual reports between 2001 
and 2012, the largest amount of cigarettes impounded 
was recorded in 2007, with 358 mn sticks seized by 
AEAT. On average, between 2001 and 2012, the 
quantity of tobacco seized per year was around 221 
mn sticks.
• Between 2007 and 2013, the number of cigarettes 
seized by AEAT decreased by 43% (from 358 mn to 
206 mn sticks) (Figure 26).23
Figure 26. Cigarettes seized by AEAT in mn sticks, 2002-2013                            
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AEAT data (2001-2013) 
Spain has a large number of police forces, a 
medium-high rate of judges, and a medium-
sized prison population. Since 2011, the country 
has implemented two awareness campaigns 
against the ITTP. However, national action 
plans against the ITTP and official estimates on 
the ITTP are lacking. There is consequently a 
medium-low level of anti-ITTP action.
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23. Transcrime elaboration on AEAT data, years 2002-2013.
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THE DEMAND
The economic crisis, rising unemployment, and 
higher cigarette prices have induced some Spaniards 
to choose cheaper illicit cigarettes. Indeed, a pack of 
illicit cigarettes, especially of the most popular brands, 
is sold for half the price of a pack sold in the legal 
market. Illicit tobacco is easily available and generally 
tolerated by Spaniards.
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•• Research on the demand for illicit tobacco in 
Spain is limited. 
• ThinkCom, a research centre of the University of 
Madrid, conducted an interview-based study on 
tobacco consumption in Spain. According to this 
study, in 2012, 3.3% of respondents reported 
having purchased cigarettes from illegal channels 
(ThinkCom 2013).24
• According to another market research, conducted by 
Altadis-Imperial, 16% of Spaniards declare that they 
have purchased tobacco through illicit channels. This 
percentage reaches 28% in Southern Spain (Altadis-
Imperial Tobacco 2013).
•• Some Spaniards choose to buy cheaper illicit 
cigarettes due to the economic crisis. 
• According to researchers and media releases, the 
economic crisis and the increasing unemployment 
rate are the main reasons for substituting 
cigarettes with illicit tobacco products. Smokers 
decide to change their smoking habits by switching 
to HRT or illicit cigarettes (Bonilla Panvela 2003; La 
Razón Digital 2012; Afi 2013; Eade 2013; El Nuevo 
Lunes 2013; El País 2013; laSexta.com 2013; Libre 
Mercado 2013; Yamagata 2013).
• In Spain, the unemployment rate increased to the 
largest extent  in 2009 (+58.9% compared with 
2008) and the ITTP started to increase thereafter 
(from 2011). Indeed, unemployment rate and ITTP 
penetration follow the same increasing trend 
(Figure 27).
• In 2013, the unemployment rate reached 23.4% in 
Spain. Andalusia and Extremadura had the highest 
rates, 36.3%, and 33.7% respectively (INE 2014a). 
Similarly, in the fourth quarter of 2013 the highest 
incidence of non-domestic cigarettes packs was 
recorded in Andalusia and Extremadura (37.7%, 
and 33.8% respectively) (see Modus operandi and 
geographical distribution, p.75).
Figure 27. ITTP penetration and unemployment rate, 2004-2012                        
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OECD (2012b) and Euromonitor International (2013a) data 
•• Smokers’ use of illicit tobacco in Spain is related 
to its affordability. A pack of illicit cigarettes, 
especially of the most popular brands, is sold for 
half the price of a pack sold in the legal market.
• Higher prices may be a strong incentive for smokers 
to seek out low/untaxed cigarette sources. If higher 
prices combine with the relatively easy availability of 
alternative cheaper sources of tobacco, consumers 
will exploit these opportunities (Hyland et al. 2006).
• The demand for illicit tobacco is strongly influenced by 
its lower price, often 30% to 50% cheaper than legal 
products (see The products, p.67) (Moodie, Hastings, 
and Joossens 2011).
• The price of legal cigarettes ranges from €3.1 for 
the cheapest brand to €4.8 for the most expensive 
one (Euromonitor International 2013a). The legal 
Marlboro brand, the most widely sold in Spain, 
cost €4.75 at tobacconists or €4.90 from vending 
machines in 2013 (Gómez 2012; Firefly Millward 
Brown 2013; laSexta.com 2013; Libre Mercado 2013; 
Millward Brown 2013; ThinkCom 2013; La Voz de La 
Línea 2014). The average price of a pack of illicit 
cigarettes in Spain, for which data are available, is 
€2.6 (Philip Morris International 2012). Contraband 
Marlboro are generally more expensive, while illicit 
white brands, like American Legend, or cheaper 
brands, cost less than €2.00 (Baigorri 2012; Yamagata 
2013).
Unemployment rate (% of the labour force)
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24. ThinkCom conducted 1,204 interviews with people aged 
between 14 and 75, asking where they usually bought tobacco 
products (ThinkCom 2013).
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59
The factbook on the illicit trade in tobacco products   S
PA
IN
•• Cigarette smuggling is generally supported and 
tolerated by Spaniards (Euromonitor International 
2012; La Razón Digital 2012; Afi 2013; El Nuevo 
Lunes 2013; Firefly Millward Brown 2013; La Voz de 
La Línea 2014).  
• ThinkCom’s survey found that 41.8% of respondents 
did not condemn the purchase of illicit cigarettes. 
Among them, 12.4% thought that buying illicit tobacco 
was ‘correct’. The percentage was higher in the 
35-44 and 25-34 age groups (15.9% and 15.4% 
respectively) (Figure 28) (ThinkCom 2013, 31). 
• In March 2012, a group of residents of Línea de la 
Concepción, near Gibraltar, demonstrated against 
the customs authorities at the Spanish border with 
Gibraltar. They demanded that the agents be less 
rigorous in their inspections at the border and, if 
possible, turn a blind eye to tobacco imports from the 
British territory (Gómez 2012).
Figure 28. To what extent does it seem to you correct or incorrect 
to buy illicit tobacco, thus evading tax duties? (% share)                                
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ThinkCom (2013) data
•• There are several reasons why Spaniards tolerate 
cigarettes smuggling.
• The economic crisis and the high unemployment rate 
(the highest in the EU) have reduced the purchasing 
power of citizens. Spaniards therefore condone the 
purchasers of illicit cigarettes’ buyers on grounds 
of their difficult economic circumstances (Bonilla 
Panvela 2003; Euromonitor International 2012; 
Gómez 2012; La Razón Digital 2012; Eade 2013; El 
Nuevo Lunes 2013; El País 2013; laSexta.com 2013; 
Yamagata 2013).  
• Spanish citizens have been outraged by recent 
episodes of political corruption and do not trust 
institutions. They believe that the state’s earnings do 
not result in benefits for citizens. Hence Spaniards do 
not feel guilty when they buy illicit cigarettes without 
paying taxes (Firefly Millward Brown 2013, 12–13).
• Spaniards see the trafficker as a social victim 
struggling to survive and protect his family. They also 
believe that traffickers offer better products at 
lower prices. Furthermore, Spaniards believe that 
smugglers are social facilitators because they help 
people to continue smoking in times of economic 
crisis (Millward Brown 2013).
•• Illicit tobacco is available in Spain in legal 
premises. The availability and the awareness 
of illicit tobacco have a positive effect on the 
demand.  
• There is evidence that illicit cigarettes are sold at 
petrol stations, restaurants, bars and 24-hour 
shops in Spain (Samper and Valdés 2013). Indeed, 
Joossens reported in 1999 that 40% of illicit cigarettes 
were sold on the streets and 23% in bars (Joossens 
1999).
• According to a survey conducted in 2008 in the EU 
Member states, the proportion of Spanish respondents 
who had seen smuggled tobacco products being sold 
in the past six months was low  (9.4%, 2.2% said 
that it happened regularly) (The Gallup Organisation 
2009).
I think it is neither incorrect nor correct I think it is quite correct
I think it is quite incorrect
I think it is very correct
I think it is very incorrect
25.6
32.7
3.4
9.0
29.4
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• Thinkcom reports that, among the 3.3% of 
respondents who purchased illicit cigarettes from 
illegal channels, 42.0% did so from illegal outlets, 
24.6% from tobacconists, 21.0% from Gibraltar 
and 12.3% from supermarkets (ThinkCom 2013, 
25).
• Illicit tobacco consumers can also purchase tobacco 
on the Internet. This is a safer way for customers 
to purchase illicit tobacco given the apparently more 
difficult traceability of transactions. According to a 
survey on tobacco use conducted in the EU Member 
states, less than 1% of EU citizens have ever 
bought tobacco products online. Spain is below 
the EU average with 0.7% of respondents who have 
ever purchased tobacco products online (The Gallup 
Organisation 2009).
Illicit tobacco is easily available in Spain. The 
economic crisis and the rising unemployment 
rate have induced some Spaniards to purchase 
illicit cigarettes. Indeed, the high price of legal 
cigarettes and  social distrust of the public 
institutions drive the demand for illicit tobacco. 
Moreover, the selling of illicit cigarettes is 
tolerated and supported by Spaniards.
The Demand
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THE SUPPLY
Individual smugglers and large-scale criminal 
organisations are the main suppliers of illicit tobacco 
in Spain. Price differentials with Gibraltar, Andorra 
and the Canary Islands, together with the current 
economic crisis, are conditions favourable for the 
supply of illicit tobacco in the country. 
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•• Tobacco smuggling in Spain is mainly carried 
out by Spanish citizens. However,  Asian groups 
are specialised in the smuggling of counterfeit 
cigarettes (AEAT 2014b).
• Traditional smuggling organisations in Spain are 
mostly composed of Spanish citizens, resident or 
established in specific areas where smuggling is 
more frequent, such as Andalusia, Galicia, Catalonia, 
Basque Country, Valencia and, more recently, the 
Canary Islands  (AEAT 2014b).
• In some instances, Asian criminal groups resident in 
Spain traffic not only counterfeit textiles and shoes but 
also counterfeit tobacco products (AEAT 2014b).
• Groups of Spanish citizens collaborate with Spanish 
criminal organisations in tobacco smuggling. Indeed, 
Spanish individuals from the Mediterranean coasts 
of Spain work with criminal organisations to export 
cigarettes, especially counterfeit and ‘cheap whites’, 
in containers directed to Northern European markets 
(United Kingdom and Ireland) (AEAT 2014b).
•• In the Spanish regions bordering on Gibraltar and 
Andorra, tobacco smuggling is a socially accepted 
opportunity to earn a living (see box Tobacco 
smugglers and the perception among Spaniards).
• Tobacco smuggling near Gibraltar is a long-
standing tradition. For some inhabitants of 
Andalusia, it is a way to earn a living. The main cause 
of this widespread practice is the cigarette price 
differential between Gibraltar and Spain: a carton of 
cigarettes costs around €25 in Gibraltar, while it costs 
€42 in Spain (Gómez 2012).
• Tobacco smuggling is a common practice on the 
Spanish side of the Pyrenees border with Andorra. 
The activity is transmitted from parents to children and 
is seen as a complementary source of income, rather 
than as a ‘criminal activity’ (Visa 2012).
• According to the Spanish Customs of La Línea de 
la Concepción, near Gibraltar, around five hundred 
people cross the border every day to import tobacco 
into Spain. They make between 20 and 50 trips 
a day and resell cigarettes to kiosks, bars and 
establishments in Andalusia. The majority of these 
‘matuteros’ (smugglers) are Spanish, Moroccan and 
Romanians (Rivas 2013).
TOBACCO SMUGGLERS AND THE 
PERCEPTION AMONG SPANIARDS
“I buy it from an old woman who sells it at the door 
of the supermarket for her grandchildren. Her son 
is out of work and they’re going through a rough 
patch” (Seville). 
“The families involved in illicit goods smuggling are 
very dysfunctional. A typical smuggler is a student 
with five brothers, his mother is unemployed, and 
his father left the family a long time ago” (Algeciras).
“Instead of Barcenas25 keeping everything, I prefer 
that a neighbour going through a rough time, should 
keep the profits” (Seville).
“Not everyone does it out of necessity. There are 
also many people who sell it because it’s the easy 
option” (Malaga).
“I think there are people who do it to supplement 
their incomes, not all of them are unemployed” 
(Seville).
“There are people who traffic tobacco, but then they 
drive really nice cars…it’s not all out of necessity” 
(Malaga) (Firefly Millward Brown 2013).
25. Barcenas is a Spanish politician who was involved in a 
political corruption scandal in January 2013.
The Supply
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•• The economic crisis and a high unemployment 
rate have boosted the supply of illicit tobacco 
in Spain and revived old networks of tobacco 
smugglers. 
• Smuggling may provide income opportunities, 
especially when unemployment is high. Indeed, 
unemployment may encourage people to offer 
their services as carriers or distributors of 
contraband, notably in the region of Andalusia near 
the border with Gibraltar (Rivas 2013).
• According to the ‘Plataforma de Parados de La 
Línea’ (Platform of unemployed people of La Línea), 
tobacco smuggling is a way of life in times of crisis 
in La Línea de la Concepción. Some argue that if 
tobacco contraband did not exist in the area, the 
social circumstances of people would worsen further 
(Gómez 2012).  
• According to the Spanish attorney Jaume Ribes, who 
is specialised in defending tobacco smugglers, the 
names of tobacco smugglers in La Seu d’Urgell, near 
Andorra, are nearly the same as those of smugglers in 
2000. The reason for this revival of tobacco smuggling 
is sudden unemployment (Baquero 2013).
• The Spanish Customs in Galicia argue that there has 
been a ‘resurgence’ of former Galician tobacco 
smuggling. However, the patterns have changed. 
Today, Galician autonomous groups import tobacco 
from Andorra, the Canary Islands and Gibraltar, 
whereas in the past it was mainly tobacco imported 
from the USA to Galicia (Europa Press 2013d).
•• The proximity of markets such as Andorra, the 
Canary Islands or Gibraltar, where there is a 
significant tax and price differential on tobacco 
products compared to those inland, and border 
permeability, favour the resale or ‘spatial 
arbitrage’ of legal products (Afi 2013).
• The prices of cigarettes in Gibraltar (a British 
Overseas Territory), Andorra and in the Canary 
Islands are significantly lower than in Spain. In 2013, 
a pack of Marlboro cost €2.80 in Gibraltar, €3.80 in 
Andorra and €2.50 in the Canary Islands, while a 
pack of Marlboro in Spain cost €4.75 (PMI 2013). 
The cigarette price differential, together with the 
tradition of tobacco smuggling in those areas, 
particularly Gibraltar and Andorra, have a positive 
effect on the supply of illicit tobacco in Spain.
•• Price differentials on excise goods across the 
EU borders foster the ITTP and make Spain a 
source country of illicit tobacco directed to other 
European markets.
• Portugal and Spain have the lowest cigarettes 
prices in Western Europe. In January 2013, a 
20-cigarette pack of Marlboro in Spain cost €4.75, and 
a pack of the cheapest brand €3.80: a price differential 
with the UK of €5.00 for the Marlboro brand and €3.80 
for the cheapest brand (see Figure 29 and Figure 30, 
pp. 64 and 65).
•• The high profitability of the ITTP stimulates the 
supply.
• The ITTP offers high profits. Diverting tobacco 
products into the illicit market, where sales are tax 
free, generates considerable margins for illicit traders 
(Joossens and Raw, 2012, p.232). Taxes account for a 
large share of the final retail price of tobacco, making 
it a highly profitable product to smuggle. 
• In Spain, the amount of total taxes per 1,000 sticks 
in International$-PPP was 250.2 in 2013. In 2010, 
when the amount was the 31st highest in the world, it 
was International$-PPP 172.5 (WHO 2012). 
• In 2013, in Spain tax incidence accounts for 80.3% 
of the WAP and 79.2% of the most sold brand (WHO 
2012; European Commission 2013a). The share 
of taxes in the retail sale price provides incentives 
for the ITTP at the national level, favouring illicit 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail distribution of illicit 
tobacco products within Spanish borders.
Chapter 2: The Four Components
64
•• The ease of retail distribution increments the 
supply.
• According to the Spanish Association of Tobacconists, 
illicit tobacco can be found in secondary retail 
channels such as petrol stations, bars, restaurants 
and 24-hour shops (Samper and Valdés 2013).
• Bars, shops, street vendors and small markets sell 
illicit cigarettes packs at an average price of €3.00, 
about 20% cheaper than the legal price (García 2011).
•• In some cases, law enforcement agents have been 
involved in tobacco smuggling in Spain.
• In 2007, a criminal organisation was dismantled in 
Vigo, in the Galicia region. Several agents of the 
Guardia Civil were arrested for controlling the illicit 
importation and distribution of tobacco from the 
Canary Islands to the Galician port of Vigo (Foces 
2011).
• Tobacco smuggled from Andorra transits mainly 
through the Spanish area of La Seu d’Urgell, twelve 
miles from the border with Andorra. The mountain 
passes separating La Seu d’Urgell from Andorra 
are historical routes for tobacco smuggling. In 2000, 
some corrupt civil guards in this area were discovered 
taking bribes from tobacco smugglers to turn a blind 
eye to the traffic and reveal secret information about 
enforcement operations (Visa 2012).
•• In 2013, an illicit tobacco manufacturing facility 
was dismantled near Madrid (García 2013).
• In June 2013, the AEAT dismantled the first illicit 
tobacco manufacturing facility in Coslada, near 
Madrid, related to another illicit manufacturing 
facility in Guadalajara. Four Poles, a Ukrainian and 
a Spaniard were arrested. This clandestine factory 
had the capacity to produce 1.5 mn cigarette packs a 
month (B. García 2013; AEAT 2014b).
Figure 29. Marlboro price in euros per 20 cigarettes, January 2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on PMI (2013) data 
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•• Two main categories of suppliers take part in the 
Spanish ITTP. They are: 
• Large scale smuggling organisations;
• Single Spanish individuals.
•• Large scale organised groups are involved in 
tobacco smuggling.
• According to the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía (Spanish 
National Police), there is a strong relationship 
between organised crime and tobacco smuggling 
and counterfeiting. The proceeds of tobacco 
smuggling are reused to fund other crimes such 
as human trafficking, drug trafficking and money 
laundering (García 2013)
• In May 2013, the Guardia Civil dismantled an 
international criminal organisation dedicated to 
tobacco smuggling and money laundering in a joint 
operation carried out in several Spanish provinces 
(including Cádiz, Malaga, Cordoba and Seville) 
as well as in Portugal, France and Belgium. The 
organisation imported tobacco from Asia, routed it 
to some African states, and then introduced it into 
Europe through Eastern European countries (Europa 
Press 2013a).
• In the Andalusia region, in Southern Spain, criminal 
organisations rent homes close to the Gibraltar border 
to receive and smuggle the tobacco illegally imported 
from Gibraltar. According to the SVA (Servicio de 
Vigilancia Aduanera), these organisations have more 
than one hundred ‘employees’ and are present in 
many Andalusian towns (Gómez 2012).
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Figure 30. Cheapest brand prices in euros per 20 cigarettes, January 2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on PMI (2013) data  
Note: Prices for the UK and Ireland are recommended retail prices. Prices for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, 
Slovenia and Sweden are maximum retail prices. Norway is a free pricing market.
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•• In some cases, foreign terrorist groups have been 
involved in large-scale smuggling.
• According to the independent think tank Foro Europa 
Ciudadana, criminal organisations and terrorist 
groups see the illicit tobacco trade as a more secure 
source of funding than drug trafficking and prostitution 
(lainformacion.com 2013). 
• The IRA organisation in Northern Ireland uses tobacco 
contraband in Gibraltar to fund its illicit activities 
(Páramo 2013).
•• Single individuals are increasingly involved in 
the fraudulent importation of tobacco products 
from neighbouring countries with lower cigarette 
prices.
• Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the 
number of Spanish citizens going to Andorra to buy 
cheaper tobacco has increased. According to the 
Guardia Civil, the profile of the tobacco smuggler 
has changed. Smugglers do not live only in the 
areas surrounding Andorra; rather, they come from 
Barcelona, Tarragona, Zaragoza or even from 
Andalusia. The typical individual smuggler is around 
40 years old and travels alone (Baquero 2013). 
• The ‘farderos’ are individuals, or small groups of 
people, who carry boxes of contraband tobacco over 
the mountain passes near Andorra in order to import 
them fraudulently into Spain (Alonso Miranda 2014).
• The ‘matuteras’ are Spanish women who cross the 
border between Gibraltar and Spain carrying illicit 
tobacco. They are generally mothers seeking an 
additional source of income. They earn around €10-12 
per day, approximately €2.00 per carton of cigarettes 
transported to Spain across the Gibraltar border 
(Diario de Jerez 2013). 
• Individuals and organisations from Romania, England, 
Bulgaria and France are increasingly involved in 
tobacco smuggling in Spain. Indeed, the illicit tobacco 
detected by the Spanish Police is often directed and 
distributed in France or the UK, where cigarette prices 
are higher (Baquero 2013).  
• In 2013, a higher incidence of bootlegged tobacco 
was detected in mail deliveries, air luggage, and at the 
border with Gibraltar (Dopico Martinez 2014).
•• Individuals arrested for tobacco smuggling in 
Spain are mainly men, of Spanish nationality, aged 
between 41 and 50 (INE 2014b).
• Analysis of the arrests for tobacco smuggling in Spain 
between 2007 and 2012 found that, in more than 
77% of cases, the persons arrested were Spanish. 
In particular, in 2012, 85.9% of the arrests involved 
Spanish citizens. Other arrests concerned individuals 
from ‘other EU Member states’ (10.9%) or from Africa 
(3.1%) (Figure 31) (INE 2014b). 
• In 2013 in Andorra, 45 people were arrested for 
tobacco smuggling. 33 were Spanish nationals, 7 
Portuguese, 3 Andorran and 2 French. They were 
mostly men and 35 years old on average (Alonso 
Miranda 2014).
Figure 31. Arrests for tobacco smuggling (Ley de Represión de 
Contrabando), 2008-2012                                                                 
Source: Transcrime elaboration on INE (2014) data 
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The Supply
Individual smugglers and large-scale criminal 
organisations are the main suppliers of illicit 
tobacco in Spain. The main factors impacting 
on the supply of illicit tobacco are cigarette 
price differentials with Gibraltar, Andorra and 
the Canary Islands, together with the current 
economic crisis.
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THE PRODUCTS
The main tobacco products smuggled into Spain 
are illicit whites and genuine contraband cigarettes. 
In particular, Ducal, American Legend and Elixyr are 
the most widespread illicit whites brands. Counterfeits 
have a low incidence in the Spanish ITTP. The main 
source countries are the Canary Islands, Andorra and 
Gibraltar. 
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•• Spanish institutions do not provide official 
estimates of the illicit tobacco market. 
Nevertheless, several institutions furnish 
estimates useful for analysing the ITTP (Table 6 
and Figure 32, p.69).
• In 2003, the study by Bonilla Panvela analysed 
the trend of the ITTP in Spain in the years 1995-
2002, examining data from Tabacalera and Altadis. 
According to this study, in 1995 16.2% of cigarettes 
were illicit. This percentage diminished to 1.8% in 
2002. This strong decrease (-88.9%) was related to 
law enforcement action against tobacco smuggling 
(Bonilla Panvela 2003).
• KPMG, through its Project Sun and by using several 
sources, investigates the penetration of illicit tobacco 
into the Spanish tobacco legal market. It divides 
cigarette packs among C&C (Counterfeit and 
Contraband), LDC (Legal Domestic Consumption), 
and ND(L) (Non-Domestic Legal Consumption). 
According to the results, C&C increased significantly 
between 2006 (2.4%) and 2013 (8.8%). The largest 
increase was registered between 2010 and 2011 
with C&C rising from 2.5% to 7.2% of total cigarette 
consumption. In 2013, the figure for C&C incidence in 
Spain is lower than the European average (10.5%), 
and Spain ranks 16th out of 28 countries surveyed 
for C&C incidence (KPMG 2014). 
• Euromonitor International estimates the size of 
the Spanish illicit market as a percentage of the total 
market.26 The ITTP’s penetration decreased from 
6% to almost 1% between 1998 and 2010, due to 
successful enforcement actions against contraband. 
A marked increase was registered between 2010 
and 2011, from 0.8% to 6.1%. In 2012, the ITTP’s 
penetration was 8.2% and Spain ranked 19th out 
of 25 European countries (Latvia ranked first and 
Denmark last, with 49.6% and 1.1% respectively) 
(Euromonitor International 2012; 2013a).
• ‘Empty Pack Surveys’ – henceforth EPSs – are 
estimates regularly provided by the tobacco industry 
on the incidence of non-domestic packs found in 
Spanish towns.27 In 2013, the non-domestic incidence 
among packs collected in Spain was 11.3%. A 
significant increase was registered between 2010 and 
2011, when non-domestic incidence grew by 126% 
passing from 4.2% to 9.4%. This increase was driven 
by increased C&C flows (Ipsos 2013; KPMG 2013).
• ThinkCom, a research centre of the Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid, conducted an interview-
based study on tobacco and alcohol consumption in 
Spain. According to this study, 3.3% of respondents 
bought cigarettes from illicit channels.28 Further, 
ThinkCom estimates that illicit cigarette penetration 
ranges between 10.23% and 11.75% in 2013 
(ThinkCom 2013).29 
 • A study on the ITTP conducted in 2012 in 18 countries 
in Europe, estimated that only 3.4% of the Spanish 
tobacco market is illicit. Indeed, on considering 
the tax evasion score, an ad hoc defined measure 
of cigarettes purchased from illicit channels derived 
by analysing the packs bought by consumers, the 
prevalence of tax evaders in Spain was below the 
average (6.5%) (Joossens et al. 2012). The study 
relied on self-reported information provided by a small 
sample of smokers, around 300. 
26. Euromonitor International estimates the illicit market through 
industry press releases, press materials, interviews with 
manufacturers and retailers, as well as local market sources.
27. These data should be used with caution because EPSs 
consider only packs of cigarettes – excluding HRT and individual 
butts – and because they do not differentiate between legal and 
illegal packs, paying attention also to the former. Finally, EPSs 
do not consider the smuggling of domestic tobacco products and 
their diversion to illicit channels. In spite of these shortcomings, 
EPSs are valuable sources for analysis of the illicit cigarettes 
market in Spain. The EPSs data for Spain are available from 
2006 to 2012.
28. ThinkCom conducted 1,204 interviews with people aged 
between 14-75, asking where they usually bought tobacco 
products (ThinkCom 2013).
29. ThinkCom calculates these estimates by comparing data 
on sales and reported consumption. Data on consumption are 
calculated using interviews. Data on sales are estimated using 
2012 data from the Comisionado para el Mercado de Tabacos 
and by taking into consideration the decrease in cigarettes sales 
for the first semester 2013 (-12%). Researchers suppose two 
scenarios for the second semester: in the first scenario, the 
decline in cigarettes consumption remains stable at -12%; in 
the second scenario, the decline reaches -15% in the second 
semester of the year. In this way, they create two estimates on 
the number of cigarettes bought in 2013 outside the network of 
legal retailers (ThinkCom 2013).
The Products
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Figure 32. Estimates of the size of the Spanish illicit cigarette market, 
1995-2013                                                                                       
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Bonilla Panvela (2003) Euromonitor International 
(2013b), KPMG (2014) and EPSs data 
•• Two types of illicit products are most widespread:
• Illicit whites;
• Genuine contraband cigarettes.
• Counterfeits have a low incidence among non-
domestic cigarettes, equal to 0.2% in the second 
quarter of 2013. In that period the company with 
the largest share of counterfeits was Philip Morris 
International (1.4%). The share of counterfeits among 
non-domestic cigarettes has been less than 0.1% 
since 2009 (Ipsos 2013).
Table 6. Estimates of the size of the Spanish illicit cigarette market. Percentage of the total market, 1995-2013
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Bonilla Panvela (2003), Euromonitor International (2013b), KPMG 2014, Thinkcom (2013) and EPSs data
Year 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Bonilla Panvela 16.2 12.9 12.8 9.0 15.1 2.5 2.1 1.8
Euromonitor 6.0 4.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 6.1 8.2
KPMG 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 7.2 7.5 8.8
EPSs
(non-domestic incidence)
5.7 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.2 9.4 10.3 11.3
Thinkcom Upper Bound 10.23
Thinkcom Lower Bound 11.75
ILLICIT WHITES
•• Approximately 55% of illicit cigarettes in Spain are 
illicit whites (KPMG 2014). 
• The Project Sun by KPMG found that illicit white 
consumption is mostly concentrated in Poland, 
Greece and Spain: these countries have significantly 
higher values than the other European countries. 
KPMG estimated that in 2013 around 2.5 bn sticks of 
illicit whites were consumed in Spain. This volume 
increased by around 34% between 2012 and 2013. 
In particular, Spain has the 3rd largest illicit white 
consumption in Europe (KPMG 2014).
• It is estimated that half of all illicit cigarettes that enter 
Spain come from Gibraltar (2.3 bn cigarettes out of 
4.43 bn illicit cigarettes in 2013). A large proportion of 
them are illicit whites with unspecified and duty free 
labeling (KPMG 2014).
•• According to EPSs, the share of illicit whites 
has increased in Spain, rising from 5.2% of non-
domestic packs in 2011 to 41.8% in the second 
quarter of 2013. In the fourth quarter of 2013 it 
decreased to 14%. 
• According to KPMG, the largest illicit whites brands 
are Ducal and American Legend. Other large C&C 
brands include Austin, Gold Classic and Elixyr. 
Moreover, in 2013 there was a proliferation of smaller 
brands, with over 50 new brands of illicit whites 
identified in Spain (KPMG 2014).
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• Among the three most widespread brands of illicit 
whites in the second quarter of 2013, Ducal had the 
highest share among non-domestic packs (15.6%), 
American Legend the third (13.1%) and Elixyr the 
sixth (4.2%) (Ipsos 2013). These three brands were 
not present in the illicit tobacco market before the 
fourth quarter of 2012. In the fourth quarter of 2013, 
the illicit white brands with the largest share among 
non-domestic cigarettes were American Legend (51%) 
and Gold Classic (30%).
• Ducal, American Legend and Elixyr are 
legally sold in the domestic Spanish market. 
Nevertheless they have a small share of the 
market. Indeed, in 2013 Elixyr had a 0.7% share of 
the Spanish legal market, American Legend 0.06%, 
and Ducal 0.02% (CMT 2014b). According to the 
empty packs collected in the fourth quarter of 2013, 
the non-domestic incidence of these brands is high 
(44%, 59.8%, and 99% for American Legend, Elyxir , 
and Ducal). 
• The ‘Elixyr’ and ‘Ducal’ brands are produced by 
Heintz Van Landewyck, reorganised in 2003 intp 
the Landewyck Group (GAL). Ducal was launched 
on the Spanish cigarettes market in 2004, Elixyr 
before 2002. Landewyck Group has production 
facilities in Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Hungary, and Andorra. Moreover, in 
2012, it established wholesale distributors in Spain, 
particularly in the Community of Madrid, Andalusia 
and in the Canary Islands (GAL 2014a; 2014b). 
• The ‘American Legend’ brand was launched on 
the Spanish market in December 2010. They are 
produced by Karelia Tobacco, whose production 
facilities are based in Greece (Karelia Tobacco 2012).
GENUINE CONTRABAND CIGARETTES
•• The number of contraband cigarettes has 
increased in recent years.
• EPSs data on the fourth quarter of 2013 show that 
the incidence of non-domestic cigarettes was 11.2%. 
The largest share among non-domestic cigarettes 
was occupied by PMI products (2.9%). The second 
companies with the same level are Landewyck 
Group and JTI (2.5%), followed by Karelia Tobacco 
(0.8%) (Figure 33). 
• The share of Landewyck Group and Karelia 
Tobacco among non-domestic products increased 
until the second quarter of 2013 and then 
decreased in the fourth quarter of 2013. Between 
2012 and the second quarter of 2013, the number 
of non-domestic packs pertaining to the Landewyck 
Group increased from an average of 1.5% to 2.6%. 
The same happened for Karelia Tobacco, from 0.9% 
to 1.5% (Figure 33). 
Figure 33. Non-domestic cigarettes, % share by company, 2010-2013   
Source: Transcrime elaboration on EPSs (2010-2013) data
•• Bootlegging and small-scale smuggling occur 
between Spain, Andorra and Gibraltar (Espinar 
2014).
• While in Spain a pack of the most widely-sold 
cigarettes brand (Marlboro) cost €4.75 in 2013, 
in Andorra it cost €3.20 and in Gibraltar €2.80. 
This difference in prices, due to the different level 
of taxation (see Regulation, p.33), increases the 
opportunities for small-scale smuggling between 
Andorra and Spain (Espinar 2014).
• Tobacco bootlegging also occurs at the border 
between Spain and Gibraltar. Here, the ‘matuteros’ 
earn a living from tobacco smuggling. Indeed, they 
cross the border with Gibraltar several times a day to 
smuggle tobacco (ThinkCom 2013; Yamagata 2013). 
In comparison with other Spanish regions, Andalusia 
(the region surrounding Gibraltar) has the higher non-
domestic incidence among cigarettes packs collected 
(see Modus operandi and geographical distribution, 
p.75).
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SEIZURES OF ILLICIT CIGARETTES 
•• According to the data on seizures provided by the 
Spanish Guardia Civil, the most seized brand in 
2012 was ‘St. Thomas’, followed by ‘Yesmoke’ and 
the ‘305’s brand (Alonso Miranda 2014).
• In 2012, 12.9% of seizures concerned the ‘St. 
Thomas’’s brand, 9.71% ‘Yesmoke’, 9.29% ‘305’s and 
8.42% American Legend (Figure 34). 
Figure 34. Seizures of illicit tobacco in 2012, (% share)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Guardia Civil (2014) data
PRICE AND ORIGIN OF ILLEGAL 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS  
•• The average price of a pack of illicit cigarettes in 
Spain, for which data are available, is €2.5 (Philip 
Morris International 2012). 
• In Spain, a pack of illicit cigarettes, especially from the 
popular brands, is sold for about half the price of a 
pack sold in the legal market.
• Media sources report a wider price range, from less 
than €2 for illicit whites to almost €3 for a pack of 
Marlboro (Philip Morris International 2012; El País 
2013; lainformacion.com 2013).
•• A large share of contraband and counterfeit 
cigarettes in Spain have either an unspecified or 
duty-free origin (KPMG 2014).
• In 2013, 35% of illicit cigarettes had ‘unspecified 
origin’, 28% ‘duty free’ origin and 17% originated 
from the Canary Islands (Figure 35). The high 
prevalence of unspecified and duty free products 
may be explained by inflows from Gibraltar. Indeed, 
cigarettes sold in that country do not carry a national 
fiscal stamp; rather, they have a duty-free label 
(KPMG 2014).
Figure 35. Contraband and counterfeit cigarettes by country of origin, 
% share, 2006–2013                                                                          
Source: Transcrime elaboration on KPMG (2014) data  
• EPSs report that 20% of the non-domestic 
packs collected in the fourth quarter of 2013 
originated from the Canary Islands, 19% from 
‘other countries’, and 14% had an ‘unspecified’ 
origin (Figure 36, p.72). The source countries for 
non-domestic cigarettes have changed over the 
years. Between the second quarter of 2009 and the 
fourth quarter of 2013, the incidence of ‘duty free’ 
areas fell from 53% to 23% of the total non-domestic 
packs. The incidence of the Canary Islands also 
decreased (from 23% to 11%). On the other hand, the 
highest increase was registered for cigarettes of 
‘unspecified’ origin (from 0% to 14%). 
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• Investigative reports and media release indicate 
Gibraltar as one of the main source countries for 
illicit cigarettes consumed in Spain (Gómez 2012; 
ABC 2013; El País 2013; Rivas 2013; Yamagata 
2013; La Voz de La Línea 2014). According to EPSs, 
the number of cigarettes arriving from Gibraltar 
increased in 2013, from less than 1% of the non-
domestic packs in the second quarter of 2013 to 
12% in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
• It is estimated that half of all illicit cigarettes 
consumed in Spain come from Gibraltar. These 
illicit flows have been increasing since 2009 (KPMG 
2014).  
Figure 36. Non-domestic cigarettes by country of origin, % share, 
2007-2013                                                                                       
Source: Transcrime elaboration on EPSs (2007-2013) data 
•• According to the data on seizures provided by 
the Guardia Civil and the AEAT, the main source 
countries of containers carrying illicit tobacco is 
China (Alonso Miranda 2014; AEAT 2014b).
• 29% of the containers seized in 2012 in Spanish ports 
originated from China, particularly from the port of 
Shanghai (Figure 37).
• In volume terms, China is the main source country of 
illicit cigarettes. However, its incidence is decreasing 
compared with the period between 2005 and 2009. 
This may be due to the increase of ‘cheap whites’ 
imports, mainly from the Canary Islands, UAE, 
Cyprus, Vietnam and Panamà (AEAT 2014b).
Figure 37. Source countries of containers seized in 2012 in Spanish 
ports (% share)                                                                                              
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Guardia Civil (2014) data.
•• Andorra and the Canary Islands are source 
countries for illicit tobacco entering Spain (Visa 
2012; Acosta 2013).
• Tobacco smuggling from Andorra is particularly 
concentrated in the Spanish area of La Seu d’Urgell, 
12 miles from the border with Andorra. The mountain 
passes between Spain and Andorra have been 
historical routes for tobacco smuggling (Visa 2012). 
According to EPSs (fourth quarter 2013), the largest 
share of non-domestic cigarettes coming from 
Andorra (46.7%) was found in Catalonia, due to its 
geographical proximity to that country. However, the 
non-domestic incidence in Catalonia is below the 
Spanish average (7.8% and 11.2% respectively).
• In 2006, the Civil Guard seized 67,000 packs of 
tobacco originating from Andorra. In 2009, the figure 
reached 311,000 packs. In 2010 and 2011, seizures 
stood at 262,172 and 242,024 packs, then increased 
considerably in 2012 with 491,842 packs seized. 
Between 2006 and 2012, the number of seized packs 
from Andorra increased sevenfold (Baquero 2013).
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• The Canary Islands are both a transit point for illicit 
tobacco evading tax and customs duties towards the 
Spanish peninsula, and a source country for illicit 
whites imported and manufactured in the islands 
(Acosta 2013).
• According to other sources, the majority of illicit 
tobacco products originate from duty-free areas, 
China, United Arab Emirates, Russia and Belarus 
(Bonilla Panvela 2003; Euromonitor International 
2012; Afi 2013; lainformacion.com 2013). 
The main products smuggled into Spain are 
illicit whites and genuine contraband cigarettes. 
Counterfeits have a low incidence among non-
domestic packs collected. Apart from illicit 
whites, whose origin is unspecified, the main 
source countries of illicit cigarettes are the 
Canary Islands, Andorra and Gibraltar.
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MODUS OPERANDI 
AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION
Several modi operandi are used to traffic illicit 
tobacco into Spain. Sea routes are prevalent for 
large-scale smuggling, inland routes for small-scale 
smuggling and bootlegging. Andorra, Gibraltar and 
the Canary Islands are source hotspots of the ITTP. 
Finally, the incidence of non-domestic cigarettes 
is higher in the Southern region of Andalusia 
and particularly in the Southern ports on the 
Mediterranean Sea.
76
THE MODUS OPERANDI
•• Tobacco smuggling is endemic in Spain. 
The modus operandi of the ITTP varies 
according to the destination, the availability of 
transportation connections, and the need to evade 
countermeasures (see box The modus operandi of 
smuggling organisations in Spain, p.78). 
• Tobacco contraband is a traditional activity in Spain. 
In the second half of the 19th century it was estimated 
at around 25% of the tobacco market. The traditional 
way to import illicit tobacco into Spain was to use 
a combination of sea and inland routes. Since 
Spain’s entry into the EU, in 1986, inland routes have 
been increasingly used to transport illicit tobacco. 
Indeed, the free circulation of goods within the EU has 
made it possible to enter items at a lower cost than 
if maritime connections are used (Bonilla Panvela 
2003).
• An element of continuity of the Spanish ITTP is the 
activity of importing and reselling of tobacco from 
Andorra and Gibraltar into the Spanish mainland 
(Bonilla Panvela 2003).
• Police operations at the end of the 1990s identified 
smuggling networks using airplanes to transport illicit 
tobacco (Bonilla Panvela 2003). This technique is still 
used, especially by organised groups from Eastern 
Europe, mainly from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and 
Ukraine (AEAT 2014b).
• Inspections by the Spanish Customs show that illicit 
tobacco is often concealed among legal products 
inside containers. The main merchandise covering 
the illicit tobacco are textiles, furniture, plastic 
articles, PC monitors, ceramic and wooden goods 
(Bonilla Panvela 2003). Another method is to use two 
containers: one of low value and loaded with legal 
goods and the other loaded with contraband tobacco. 
The smugglers exchange the containers’ numbers 
and vary their destinations, sending illegal tobacco to 
Spain (Alonso Miranda 2014).
• According to the Spanish Police, an emerging issue in 
tobacco smuggling is the illicit cultivation of tobacco. 
Indeed, illicit tobacco crops have recently been 
discovered in Spain (Dopico Martinez 2014). 
•• Spain is a destination, transit, and source country 
for the ITTP.
• The AEAT maintains that there has been a ‘radical 
change’ in the purposes of the ITTP in Spain. 
Nowadays most of the illicit tobacco entering 
Spain remains in the country for domestic 
consumption whereas, in 2010, 80% of tobacco 
seized was bound  for other EU countries, and 
national consumption was ‘residual’ (La Razón Digital 
2012).
• The prices of cigarettes are significantly higher in 
Northern European markets than in Spain. According 
to a study by the Spanish Customs on tobacco 
contraband in Spain, between 1994 and 2002 Spain 
was mainly a transit country for illicit tobacco 
directed to Northern Europe. Indeed, the most 
frequently seized brands had little or no consumption 
in the Spanish market. These brands were mainly 
Benson & Hedges, Regal, Super Kings, Magnum and 
Sovereign (Bonilla Panvela 2003). 
• A nit of the Spanish Judicial Police (Policía Judicial) 
specialised in Money Laundering, Contraband and 
Frauds (Blanqueo de Capitales, Contrabando y 
Fraude a la Hacienda Comunitaria) informs that Spain 
is a transit country for illicit tobacco mainly directed to 
Germany and Holland (Notimex 2011).
• Spain is also a source country for illicit tobacco 
products. In 2013, around 0.39 bn illicit cigarettes 
were diverted from Spain to other EU countries. 
However, illicit outflows have decreased in 
comparison with 2012, when 0.96 bn sticks were 
destined to other illicit markets (KPMG 2014).
Modus operandi and geographical distribution
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•• Smugglers exploit different channels to smuggle 
cigarettes in Spain.
• The Spanish regions used to introduce illicit tobacco 
into Spain are western Andalusia, on the border with 
Gibraltar, Galicia’s bordering provinces with Portugal, 
and Catalonia, on the border with Andorra (Dopico 
Martinez 2014).
• The Fiscal Unit of the Spanish Civil Guard reports that 
62% of the tobacco seizures made in 2012 occurred 
in customs areas and 37.5% outside customs areas. 
The remaining 0.5% occurred in territorial waters, on 
the coasts, on beaches, and almost exclusively on 
the coast of the Bay of Algeciras, where tobacco is 
imported from Gibraltar (El Nuevo Lunes 2013).
• The most traditional way to introduce tobacco 
fraudulently into Spain is to import it from border 
areas where tobacco has a tax advantage and prices 
are lower than in Spain. These areas are mainly 
Gibraltar, Andorra and the Canary Islands (García 
2013). 
• The Spanish Guardia Civil warns that between 
2006 and 2012, Andorra and Gibraltar significantly 
increased their tobacco imports. In particular, Andorra 
doubled its imports, from 48 mn to 94 mn packs. 
Gibraltar, from 38 mn packs in 2006 to 139 mn in 
2012 (García 2013). The population of these countries 
is relatively small, 30,001 inhabitants in Gibraltar and 
76,246 in Andorra. If all the tobacco imported was 
consumed by locals, the amount would correspond 
to 12 packs of cigarettes a day per every inhabitant 
in Gibraltar and 3 packs of cigarettes a day for every 
inhabitant of Andorra.30 
•• Gibraltar is a focal point for the introduction 
of illicit tobacco into Spain. This is mainly due 
to the permeability of its borders (Foro Europa 
Ciudadana 2013).
• The main modus operandi for bringing illicit tobacco 
into Spain through Gibraltar involves the use of 
vehicles with hidden compartments, the employment 
of ‘matuteros’, people walking across the border 
carrying more than the allowed quantity of tobacco, 
the use of speed-boats, and less frequently, fishing 
boats (Rivas 2013).
• Smugglers cross the border between Gibraltar and 
Spain in vehicles and hide tobacco inside the seats 
or in hidden compartments. These cars distribute 
tobacco from Gibraltar to Jerez de la Frontera, Seville 
and Malaga, in the Andalusia region. Some of these 
cars are headed for Madrid and Barcelona (Voz Populi 
2013). 
• Many people enter Gibraltar on foot, others by 
bicycle. Some smugglers carry their ID card around 
their necks because they cross the border several 
times a day. They use old and broken bicycles in order 
to minimise their loss in the case of arrest and seizure 
by law enforcement (Voz Populi 2013).  
• In 2012, the Guardia Civil seized more than 725,000 
packs of cigarettes originating from Gibraltar. 
The largest quantity (80%) was hidden in vehicles, a 
smaller amount (15%) under the clothes of individual 
smugglers (Europa Press 2013b).  
30. The figure for the population of Gibraltar in 2012 has been 
taken from the Statistics Office of Gibraltar.The figure for the 
population of Andorra has been taken from the Departament 
d’Estadística of Andorra.
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•• The New IRA imports tobacco from Asia to Spain 
and distributes it in the UK and Ireland.
• The new IRA imports tobacco from China and Vietnam 
to Spain. Tobacco is shipped in containers and is 
directed to the ports of Valencia and Gibraltar. Once 
in Spain, the tobacco is stocked in storages, and then 
transported on trucks carrying mainly fruit, frozen 
vegetables or fish to the final destination in the UK 
and Ireland (Colmenero 2013). 
• The organisation also imports tobacco from the 
Canary Islands by using charter flights and hiding 
cigarettes in luggage to transport it to Ireland 
(Colmenero 2013).
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
•• The AEAT has designated Catalonia, the Canary 
Islands, Galicia and the Andalusian border with 
Gibraltar as major ‘sources of risk’ for the illicit 
trade in tobacco products (La Razón Digital 2012). 
• According to the AEAT, Catalonia is the entry point for 
40% of the illicit tobacco in Spain. The tobacco mainly 
arrives in Lleida, on the Andorran border, at the Farga 
de Moles customs point, or at the port of Barcelona 
(La Razón Digital 2012).
• The criminal organisations involved in tobacco 
smuggling operate from several points in Spain and 
have contacts in various provinces. Andalusia is 
one of the hot spots, and the Strait of Gibraltar is 
considered one of the transit points for tobacco 
smuggling (García 2011; AEAT 2014b).
•• According to the EPSs conducted in Spain in 
2013, the highest non-domestic incidence among 
packs collected is registered in the southern 
regions of Andalusia and Extremadura (Figure 38, 
p.79).
• Andalusia, the Spanish region bordering on Gibraltar, 
had the  highest non-domestic incidence in the fourth 
quarter of 2013 (37.7%). In this region, twelve cities 
have been surveyed as part of the Empty Pack 
Surveys’ research. Moreover, in the period between 
2007 and 2011, the non-domestic incidence rose from 
3.9% to 39.7%, a 900% increase in six years.
• Between 2012 and 2013, eleven out of twelve 
cities surveyed in Andalusia had a non-domestic 
incidence above the country average (10.8%). The 
cities with the highest non-domestic incidence were 
Algeciras (76.2%), Marbella (66.6%) and Malaga 
(40.8%) (Figure 39, p.80). 
THE MODUS OPERANDI OF SMUGGLING ORGANISATIONS IN SPAIN 
In June 2013, the Guardia Civil dismantled a criminal organisation which imported tobacco from Gibraltar and 
distributed it in the cities of Cádiz and Seville. The group was formed of fifteen people and had a hierarchical 
structure with one lead person. The modus operandi was threefold: either it used single ‘matuteros’, individuals 
who repeatedly crossed the border with Gibraltar carrying illicit tobacco, or it unloaded the cartons of cigarettes in 
boundary waters, or hid tobacco inside containers stuffed with legal commodities. The members of the organisation 
used a restaurant to store the tobacco and as a place where ‘workers’ were paid for the goods delivered throughout 
the day (Guardia Civil 2013).
The Guardia Civil, with the ‘CUMPAI’ operation mounted in Cádiz, Málaga, Córdoba, Seville, Valencia, Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife, Portugal, France and Belgium, dismantled an international organisation involved in tobacco smuggling 
and money laundering. The network had members in various ports of the EU and facilitated the transportation, 
transfer of tobacco to ships, and the wholesale distribution. The organisation was able to introduce at least 10 
containers of smuggled tobacco every month, with a profit of €1.1 mn per container (Europa Press 2013a).
In 2012, more than 35 tonnes of illegal tobacco were seized within the ‘AGUIJÓN’ operation. This was the largest 
seizure made by the Spanish Customs in recent years. The tobacco arrived in Valencia from the Chinese port of 
Shenzhen. The tobacco was smuggled into Spain in order to be distributed to other countries in Europe (World 
Customs Organization 2013). 
Modus operandi and geographical distribution
79
The factbook on the illicit trade in tobacco products   S
PA
IN
• Extremadura is the Spanish region with the second 
highest non-domestic incidence, 33.8% according to 
the EPSs of the fourth quarter of 2013. However, the 
results should be treated with caution because the 
sample of collected packs in the region refers only to 
the city of Badajoz. 
•• Non-domestic incidence in the Southern ports 
of Andalusia is higher than in other Spanish 
ports. However, in 2012, the majority of seizures 
of containers occurred in the port of Valencia 
(Alonso Miranda 2014). According to the AEAT, the 
ports of Malaga and Cadiz are strategic hotspots 
for the ITTP in Spain (AEAT 2014b).
• Analysis of the empty cigarettes packs collected in 
23 Spanish ports between 2012 and 2013 showed 
that nine ports were above the national average 
for non-domestic incidence (10.8%). These ports 
included the Andalusian ones of Algeciras (76.2%), 
Marbella (66.6%), Málaga (40.8%), Cádiz (38.7%), 
Huelva (37.2%), Jerez de la Frontera (36.0%), and 
Almería (1.0%), and the ports of Badalona (12.4%) in 
Catalonia, and A Coruña (11.4%) in Galicia.
• In 2012, 38% of seizures of containers with illicit 
tobacco occurred in the port of Valencia, 25% in 
the port of Barcelona and 8% in Algeciras (Alonso 
Miranda 2014).
• In January 2013, the AEAT dismantled a smuggling 
organisation in Algeciras. The organisation was 
based in Madrid, the Canary Islands and Algeciras. 
It imported illicit tobacco into Spain by falsifying 
declarations on the merchandise transported inside 
containers in order to distribute it in the domestic 
market (AEAT 2013c).
•• Police operations show that the port of Bilbao is 
used as a transit point for illicit tobacco directed 
to Northern Europe. 
• In January 2014, a ship container stuffed with illicit 
cigarettes originating from Russia and directed 
to the UK, was seized in Bilbao by the AEAT. The 
organisation was ramified between Madrid, the 
Canary Islands and Algeciras (AEAT 2013c).
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• Operation ‘TRUYEYE’, carried out in March 2013 
by the AEAT, dismantled an organised cigarette-
smuggling network which transported tobacco from 
the port of Bilbao to Ireland. The higher pricing 
of cigarettes in Ireland, as well as the good road 
communications of the port of Bilbao and its high 
merchant traffic with the British Isles have made 
cigarette-smuggling along this route particularly 
attractive (AEAT 2013b).
In conclusion, in Spain tobacco smugglers use 
both sea and inland routes. Gibraltar, the Canary 
Islands and Andorra are source hotspots for 
the ITTP, and Andalusia has a high penetration 
of non-domestic cigarettes. Cities with ports, 
particularly in Andalusia, have a non-domestic 
incidence higher than the national average. 
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THE FOUR KEY FACTORS
This chapter draws on the results of the previous 
analyses and identifies the key factors of the ITTP. 
The key factors are the opportunities that can affect 
the ITTP. Like any other market, also that for tobacco 
products creates illegal opportunities and hosts specific 
actors and activities. They derive from the link between 
drivers and components of the ITTP. The drivers 
impact or may impact on the different components 
of the ITTP through four key factors. Therefore, it is 
necessary to identify the possible interactions between 
drivers and components in order to remove any possible 
opportunity/vulnerability which may facilitate the action 
of criminal players and shape the illicit trade in tobacco 
products.
The four key factors of the ITTP are economic 
accessibility, availability, profitability, and risk.
•• Economic accessibility: the price of illicit tobacco, 
and particularly its relative price compared to the 
price of legal products.  
•• Availability: the ease with which both smugglers 
and consumers can obtain illicit tobacco 
products.
•• Profitability: the ability of the ITTP to generate 
profits that exceed its operational costs.
•• Risk: the threat of detection/accusation/conviction 
and the sanctions imposable on the actors 
involved in the ITTP.
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• Spain has the highest unemployment rate among 
35 OECD countries (26.3% of labour force in 2013). 
This has an impact on both the demand for and the 
supply of illicit tobacco. Indeed, unemployment rate 
and ITTP penetration are positively correlated and 
follow the same increasing trend (see The demand, 
p.57). Moreover, illicit tobacco is more widespread 
in Andalusia and Extremadura, where the 
unemployment rate is higher (Gómez 2012; Ipsos 
2013; INE 2014a). 
•• Cigarette tax increases and higher cigarette prices 
have caused a decrease in legal cigarette sales 
and induced some Spaniards to switch to more 
economically accessible illicit tobacco. 
ECONOMIC ACCESSIBILITY
(Figure 40)
•• The economic crisis in Spain, the high 
unemployment rate and the decreased purchasing 
power of Spaniards are conditions fostering 
the demand for illicit tobacco due to its greater 
economic accessibility.
• People decide to buy or sell illicit cigarettes 
because of their difficult economic circumstances 
(Bonilla Panvela 2003; Gómez 2012; La Razón Digital 
2012; El Nuevo Lunes 2013; El País 2013; laSexta.
com 2013).  
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Figure 40. Framing the components in the drivers through economic accessibility
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
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• Taxation on tobacco products in Spain is high, both 
as tax incidence on the final retail price, and as total 
tax per 1,000 sticks. Illicit cigarettes can generally be 
purchased at €2 less than legal ones. Nevertheless, 
there is no fixed price in the black market. Indeed, 
while illicit white brands are sold at a price of less 
than €2, contraband cigarettes are more expensive 
(Baigorri 2012; Yamagata 2013).
• The increase in cigarette prices has generated 
demand for cheaper tobacco products. This is 
shown by the increasing number of Spaniards, in 
particular in Andalusia, crossing the border to 
Gibraltar to purchase cheaper cigarettes (Diario de 
Jerez 2013; Rivas 2013). 
AVAILABILITY
(Figure 41)
•• The availability of illicit tobacco in Spain impacts 
positively on the demand for and supply of illicit 
tobacco.
• Illicit tobacco is easily available in some regions 
of Spain. Indeed, in some cases, bars, shops, street 
vendors and small markets have been reported 
selling illicit cigarettes (García 2011). 
• A survey reports that 3.3% of smokers buy cigarettes 
from illegal channels. Within this percentage, 42.0% 
buy illicit cigarettes from illegal sources, 24.6% 
from tobacconists, 21.0% from Gibraltar and 
12.3% from supermarkets (ThinkCom 2013, 25).
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•• The widespread social acceptance and tolerance 
of contraband are important factors boosting the 
availability of illicit tobacco goods and favouring 
the demand.
• In Spain, smuggling enjoys social acceptance. A 
survey reports that around 41% of Spaniards do not 
have a negative opinion on tobacco smuggling 
(ThinkCom 2013).
• There are several reasons why Spaniards tolerate 
cigarette smuggling. First, people justify illicit 
cigarette buyers on grounds of their difficult 
economic circumstances. Second, Spaniards 
believe that the state’s earnings do not result in 
benefits for citizens. Third, they see traffickers 
as social victims struggling to survive. Finally, they 
believe that traffickers offer better products at lower 
prices (Bonilla Panvela 2003; Gómez 2012; Firefly 
Millward Brown 2013).
•• Cigarettes with lower prices in neighbouring 
countries increase the availability of tobacco 
products to be bootlegged and smuggled.
• The majority of inflows into Spain originate from the 
surrounding low-priced markets of Gibraltar, Andorra 
and the Canary Islands. These markets have lower or 
no taxes on tobacco products, and their cigarettes are 
significantly cheaper. Their average price is  €2.50-
€3.00 per pack (KPMG 2014).
• Higher prices may be a strong incentive for smokers 
to seek out low/untaxed cigarettes. If higher prices 
combine with the relatively easy availability of 
alternative cheaper sources of tobacco, consumers 
will exploit these opportunities (Hyland et al. 2006).
• In the Canary Islands, which are formally part of 
Spain, the price of cigarettes is lower due to a 
different taxation regime. It is for this reason that, in 
2013, 17% of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes in 
Spain came from the Canary Islands (KPMG 2014). 
• Prices of cigarettes in Spain are among the lowest 
in Europe. However, the country shares borders 
with Portugal, Andorra and Gibraltar, which have 
lower cigarette prices. Spaniards cross the border 
with Andorra and especially with Gibraltar to 
buy cheaper cigarettes (Gómez 2012). Indeed, it is 
estimated that half of all illicit cigarettes entering Spain 
come from Gibraltar (KPMG 2014).
•• Regulation and enforcement measures have 
an ambivalent effect on the availability of illicit 
tobacco products. They may either discourage or 
boost the availability of illicit tobacco in Spain.
• The retail of tobacco is subject to licensing in 
Spain (Royal Decree 1199/1999 and Law 13/1998). 
This may have a negative impact on the availability of 
illicit tobacco. 
• However, the manufacture, wholesale and 
importation of tobacco products are no longer subject 
to licensing (Law 13/1998, as amended by Law 
25/2009). In particular, it is only necessary to submit 
a sworn statement and formal documents to the 
CMT. After 15 days from the notification, the person 
concerned is entitled to act in the tobacco market if 
the CMT does not intervene.
• Article 8 of the Royal Decree 1199/1999 (as amended 
in 2013) obliges all tobacco manufacturers, importers 
and distributors to provide the CMT, upon request, 
with any documents, books and records with detailed 
information about the origin and destination of the 
tobacco products and the underlying transactions. 
This may contribute to reducing the availability of 
illicit tobacco products in Spain.
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• The European Commission agreements, which 
have specific provisions for supply chain control, 
are legally binding only for PMI, JTI, BAT and IT, 
while its provisions do not bind the other tobacco 
manufacturers. The lack of specific agreements with 
tobacco manufacturers, other than the four majors, 
may increase the diversion of tobacco products from 
their supply chain and favour the availability of illicit 
tobacco products. 
• In 2013, CMT controls on the tobacco market 
found 1,786 cases of sales without licence. In 
these cases the tobacco was legal, but the retailers 
did not comply with the regulatory requirements. This 
type of retailing may increase the availability of illicit 
tobacco.
•• Increasing corruption may impact positively on 
the availability of illicit tobacco.
• The Corruption Perception Index is medium-low 
in comparison with the global average but high if 
compared with most EU Member States. Further, 
the perception of corruption has increased in 
Spain (European Commission 2014c; GRECO 2014). 
According to national surveys, in 2011, 46.8% of 
respondents considered corruption to be very 
widespread and 39.8% thought that it was quite 
widespread. More recent surveys in January 2014 
placed corruption second in the range of public 
problems identified by Spanish respondents (CIS 
2014; European Commission 2014d).
• In some cases, law enforcement agents have been 
involved in tobacco smuggling in Spain. They have 
been persuaded to turn a blind eye to the traffic. The 
corruption of law enforcement officers increases the 
availability of illicit tobacco by diminishing the risk of 
arrest and conviction for smugglers.
PROFITABILITY
(Figure 42, p.88)
•• The proximity of markets such as Andorra, the 
Canary Islands and Gibraltar, where there is a 
significant tax and price differential on tobacco 
products, favours the retail or ‘spatial arbitrage’ of 
legal products (Afi 2013).
• Taxation on tobacco products in the Canary 
Islands is lower than on the Spanish mainland, 
both as tax incidence on the final retail price and as 
monetary value per 1,000 sticks. This makes the ITTP 
profitable between these two areas.
• Tobacco smuggling between Gibraltar and Spain 
is a consolidated activity. The main cause for this 
widespread practice is the cigarette price differential 
between Gibraltar and Spain (Gómez 2012).
• High unemployment may encourage people to 
offer their services as carriers or distributors of 
contraband, notably in the region of Andalusia, near 
the border with Gibraltar (Rivas 2013). The ‘matuteros’ 
in Andalusia earn a living from tobacco smuggling. 
Indeed, they cross the border with Gibraltar several 
times a day to smuggle tobacco out of necessity 
(ThinkCom 2013; Yamagata 2013).
• The Spanish side of the Pyrenees bordering on 
Andorra is a hotspot for tobacco smuggling. This 
activity is seen as a complementary source of income, 
rather than as a ‘criminal activity’ (Visa 2012). 
•• The prices of cigarettes are significantly higher 
in Northern European markets than in Spain. This 
makes the ITTP towards Northern EU markets a 
profitable activity.
• Portugal and Spain have the lowest cigarettes 
prices in Western Europe. In January 2013, a 
20-cigarette pack of Marlboro in Spain cost €4.70, 
and a pack of the cheapest brand €3.80. The price 
differential with the UK is €5.00 for Marlboro and 
€3.80 for the cheapest brand. 
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• The illicit tobacco seized by the Spanish Police 
is often directed to and distributed in foreign 
countries like France or Britain, where its price is 
higher (Baquero 2013).
RISK
(Figure 43, p.89)
•• ‘Spatial arbitrage’ of legal products between 
Spain, Andorra, the Canary Islands and Gibraltar 
is favoured by ‘border permeability’ (Afi 2013).
• The permeability of the borders between 
Spain, Andorra, the Canary Islands, and Gibraltar 
decreases the risks for the actors involved in the 
ITTP. In particular, Gibraltar is a focal point for the 
introduction of illicit tobacco into Spain (Foro Europa 
Ciudadana 2013).
•• The CMT’s controls on the tobacco supply chain 
increase the risks for the ITTP. However, the 
presence of loopholes in supply chain control 
impacts on the ITTP by decreasing the risks for 
smugglers. 
• The absence of a tracking and tracing system may 
increase the availability of illicit tobacco by reducing 
the risks for smugglers.
• The obligation on the tobacco industry 
(manufacturers, importers and distributors) to 
provide, upon request, the CMT with any documents 
regarding the origin and destination of tobacco 
products increases the risks of the diversion of 
tobacco products from the legal supply chain.
Figure 42. Framing the components in the drivers through profitability
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Demanda Oferta Productos
Mercado 
legal
Desempleo
Sociedad y 
economía
Diferencias 
de precios
RENTABILIDAD
Impulsor Componente
Incidencia 
fiscal 
Modus operandi y 
distribución geográfica
Entorno 
delictivo
Aplicación de 
la ley
Disminución de ITTPAugmento del ITTP
Regulación
Modus operandi and
geog aphical distributionDe Supply Produ ts
Decrease  of the ITTPDriver Component Increase of th  ITTP
Leg l 
market
i ty and
y
Price 
differentials
PROFITAB LITY
Tax incidence
Crime 
environement Enforcementl tio
Unemployment
The Four Key Factors of the ITTP
89
The factbook on the illicit trade in tobacco products   S
PA
IN
• CMT controls in 2013 found 5,017 infringements of 
Law 13/1998. These CMT controls on the tobacco 
market can increase the risks for smugglers.
•• Increasing corruption may decrease the risks 
connected with the ITTP.
• The occurrence of episodes of corruption among 
Spanish law enforcers may decrease the perception 
of risk among smugglers and favour the supply of illicit 
tobacco.
•• Tolerance towards contraband activities may 
boost the demand for and the supply of the ITTP 
by diminishing the risks for the players.
• Spaniards in general tolerate and support cigarettes 
smuggling. This tolerance significantly reduces 
the risk for smugglers of being accused and 
prosecuted. 
• In particular, in the Spanish regions bordering on 
Gibraltar and Andorra, tobacco smuggling is a 
socially accepted opportunity to earn a living.
Figure 43. Framing the components in the drivers through the risk 
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
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•• The presence of FTZs: Vigo, Barcelona, Cádiz and 
Grand Canaria boosts the supply of illicit tobacco 
by decreasing the risks for smugglers.
• In particular, the port of Barcelona has been identified 
as receiving Chinese counterfeit products bound for 
Western Europe (BASCAP 2012). 
•• Law enforcement cooperation in the fight against 
tobacco smuggling has a significant impact on 
the ITTP by increasing the risks for the actors 
involved.
• The Spanish Customs has signed bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with countries, both in the 
EU and outside the EU, on cooperation and mutual 
assistance in customs matters. These agreements 
impact negatively on the supply of illicit tobacco by 
increasing the risks for smugglers.
•• The hypothetical penalty adopted for a serious 
ITTP case ranges between 9 years and 24 years 
of imprisonment. However, in the majority of ITTP 
cases prosecuted in Spain, the penalty imposed 
oscillates between 0 and 2 years of imprisonment.
• The low penalties imposed for tobacco smuggling 
in Spain may not be a good deterrent for the ITTP 
because they reduce the perception of risk among 
smugglers.
The Four Key Factors of the ITTP
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This report provides the Spanish country profile of 
the Factbook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products 
project. Considering the relative limited number of 
studies and the lack of data, the results of this study are 
provisional. It offers a first analysis of the ITTP in Spain 
and shows that more research is needed in this field. The 
ITTP is a complex phenomenon comprising a variety of 
activities, products and actors. The analysis of the illicit 
trade must take into account a number of factors, which 
may significantly influence it.
This report has analysed the multiple facets of the 
ITTP in Spain. The information gathered originates 
from academic literature, grey literature, open sources, 
questionnaires and interviews with experts and 
stakeholders.
THE FIVE DRIVERS
Chapter 1 (The Five Drivers) of the report analysed in 
detail the five drivers of the ITTP: society and economy, 
regulation, legal market, crime environment and 
enforcement. The five drivers are areas whose structures 
positively or negatively affect the various components of 
the ITTP.
•• Society and Economy: Spain has been hit hard 
by the global financial crisis. The unemployment 
rate has increased, while both GDP per capita and 
household consumption have decreased. The Spanish 
Government is currently being aided by the EU and 
international organisations to accelerate its economic 
recovery. Health and education expenditures are 
below the EU average and income inequality is among 
the highest among EU member states.
•• Legal Market: The Spanish tobacco market is 
relatively large on a global scale. However, legal 
cigarettes sales have fallen in the past decade, while 
HRT sales have grown significantly. Cigarettes prices 
are high in global terms, but cigarettes are relatively 
affordable. Smoking prevalence is high and varies 
across Spanish regions. 
•• Regulation: Taxation on tobacco products has 
increased since 2005 and is among the highest on a 
global level, both as tax incidence on the retail price 
and as monetary value per 1,000 sticks. However, 
the Spanish Canary Islands have a different taxation 
regime, which allows them to levy lower taxation on 
tobacco. There is a medium-low level of control on 
the supply chain and a medium-high level of control 
on tobacco marketing and promotion and on tobacco 
consumption and sales.
•• Crime Environment: Spain has recorded a decrease 
in crime rates in recent years. There is a medium 
presence of organised crime activities mainly centred 
on drug trafficking, property crimes and human 
trafficking. Drug consumption is high, especially 
for cannabis and cocaine. The shadow economy is 
medium-low in its extent, and corruption is a growing 
concern within Spanish society.  
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•• Enforcement: Since 2011, Spain has implemented 
two awareness campaigns against the ITTP. 
Moreover, law enforcement agencies and the Spanish 
Customs have stipulated cooperation agreements 
with foreign customs and law enforcement agencies 
to tackle the ITTP. The average penalty for tobacco 
contraband is low, between 0-2 years. In conclusion, 
the anti-ITTP action is medium-low in Spain owing to 
the absence of official estimates on, and a national 
action plan against, the ITTP.
THE FOUR COMPONENTS OF THE ITTP
Chapter 2 (The Four Components) discussed in detail 
the characteristics of the illicit trade in Spain by breaking 
the illicit tobacco market down into its four components: 
demand, supply, products, modus operandi and 
geographical distribution.
•• The demand: The demand for illicit tobacco products 
in Spain responds to the economic crisis, rising 
unemployment and higher cigarettes prices. Indeed, a 
pack of illicit cigarettes, especially of the most popular 
brands, is sold for half the price of a pack sold in the 
legal market. Illicit tobacco is easily available and 
generally tolerated by Spanish people.
•• The supply: Single smugglers and large-scale 
criminal organisations are the main suppliers of illicit 
tobacco in Spain. Price differentials with Gibraltar, 
Andorra and the Canary Islands, together with the 
current economic crisis, are conditions favourable for 
the supply of illicit tobacco in the country.
•• The products:  The main tobacco products smuggled 
into Spain are illicit whites and genuine contraband 
cigarettes. In particular, Ducal, American Legend and 
Elixyr are the most widespread illicit whites brands. 
Counterfeits cigarettes have a low incidence within 
the Spanish ITTP. The main source countries of 
illicit cigarettes are the Canary Islands, Andorra and 
Gibraltar. 
•• Modus operandi and Geographical Distribution:  
Several modi operandi are used to traffic illicit tobacco 
in Spain. Sea routes and inland routes are both 
employed: the former for large-scale smuggling, the 
latter for small-scale smuggling. Andorra, Gibraltar 
and the Canary Islands are source hotspots of 
the Spanish ITTP. Finally, the incidence of non-
domestic cigarettes is higher in the Southern region 
of Andalusia and particularly in the ports on the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
FRAMING THE COMPONENTS IN THE 
DRIVERS
Chapter 3 (Framing the Components in the Drivers) 
addressed the interactions between the drivers and the 
components of the ITTP. The analysis identified four key 
factors with a fundamental role in shaping the illicit market 
(economic accessibility, availability, profitability, risk).
•• Economic accessibility: the economic crisis in 
Spain, the high unemployment rate, and the decreased 
purchasing power of Spaniards are conditions favourable 
for the demand for illicit tobacco. Cigarette tax increases 
result in higher cigarette prices and may induce some 
Spaniards to switch to more economically accessible illicit 
tobacco. 
•• Availability: the regulation or deregulation of the 
tobacco sector impacts both positively and negatively 
on the availability of illicit tobacco. Indeed, on the 
one hand, the presence of a licensing obligation for 
tobacco retailers may reduce the availability of illicit 
tobacco products. However, on the other hand, the 
absence of licensing for tobacco manufacturers, 
wholesalers and importers may increase the diversion 
of tobacco from the legal supply chain. Furthermore, 
the agreements of the European Commission with the 
four major tobacco companies on supply chain control 
may reduce the diversion of tobacco products from the 
legal supply chain. Nevertheless, these agreements 
are not legally binding on smaller manufacturers; 
which may increase the diversion of tobacco products 
into the illegal market. Furthermore, the availability of 
illicit tobacco in legal premises, Spaniards’ tolerance 
towards smuggling, and proximity to markets with 
lower cigarette prices may increase the availability of 
illicit tobacco.
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•• Profitability: taxes account for a large share of the 
final retail price of tobacco in Spain, and this makes 
the ITTP a profitable activity. Moreover, proximity 
to markets such as Andorra, the Canary Islands 
and Gibraltar, where there is a significant tax and 
price differential on tobacco products, favours the 
smuggling of legal products. Finally, the high price 
of cigarettes in Northern European markets makes 
the ITTP from Spain towards Northern EU markets a 
profitable activity. 
•• Risk: the CMT’s controls on the tobacco supply 
chain increase the risks for the ITTP. However, social 
acceptance and tolerance towards contraband, the 
absence of a tracking and tracing system, and the 
presence of FTZs may reduce the risks for tobacco 
smugglers. The permeability of the borders between 
Spain, Andorra, the Canary Islands, and Gibraltar 
may reduce the risks for smugglers. Moreover, the 
low penalties imposed for tobacco smuggling in 
Spain may decrease the perception of risk among 
smugglers. Despite these factors favouring the ITTP, 
Spanish law enforcement agencies cooperate with 
European and international institutions to combat the 
ITTP, increasing the risks connected with this activity.    
Figure 44. Main interactions between the drivers and the ITTP in Spain
Source: Transcrime elaboration 
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As pointed out, the ITTP is a complex phenomenon with 
several determinants.After close analysis on the ITTP 
in Spain, there follow the main findings of the Factbook 
(Figure 44, p.93).
The ITTP in Spain decreased strongly between 1995 
and 2000, remaining stable at about 1% of the cigarettes 
market until 2011, and reaching 8.8% of the cigarettes 
market in 2013. Unemployment and higher cigarette 
prices are the main drivers of this increase. 
The increase in the unemployment rate, and both 
the decrease of per capita GDP and consumption 
expenditure, have changed the habits of Spaniards 
in terms of tobacco consumption. While legal sales 
of cigarettes halved between 2008 and 2012 (-44%), 
both HRT sales and ITTP penetration grew. Higher 
cigarette prices due to regulatory interventions in 
the tobacco sector (e.g. the introduction of the Minimum 
Excise Tax on cigarettes in 2006 and its increase in 
2009-2010) may explain this tendency of consumers to 
downtrade to cheaper tobacco products.
The ITTP in Spain is not widespread throughout the 
country, but is mainly concentrated in two regions, 
Andalusia and Extremadura. These two regions are 
also those with the highest unemployment rates on the 
Spanish mainland. Moreover, Andalusia shares borders 
with Gibraltar, where tobacco costs nearly half the price 
in Spain. As in the case of the border with Andorra, the 
price differential for tobacco boosts smuggling across the 
borders.
Moreover, Spain is a country of origin, transit and 
destination for tobacco products. It formally includes the 
Canary Islands, where the price of cigarettes is lower 
due to a different taxation regime. This makes the Canary 
Islands one of the main sources of illicit tobacco. 
Illicit tobacco is easily available in Spain. It can be found 
in legal premises, such as bars, shops, petrol stations, 
and in street markets. Moreover, tobacco smuggling 
enjoys social acceptance and is largely tolerated by 
the population, who associate it with difficult economic 
circumstances. 
Illicit whites are the main illicit tobacco product smuggled 
into Spain. The most widespread illicit whites’ brands 
are also legally sold in the domestic Spanish market. 
Nevertheless they have a small share of the market 
(between 0.02% of the cigarettes market and 0.7% in 
2013). 
The agreements between the European Commission 
and the four largest tobacco manufacturers (PMI, JTI, 
BAT and IT) contain specific provisions for supply chain 
control in the tobacco sector. Nevertheless, some smaller 
manufacturers, such as Landewyck Group and Karelia 
Tobacco, which had a large share of non-domestic packs 
collected in Spain last year, are not bound by these 
agreements. This may increase the availability of tobacco 
diverted from the legal tobacco supply chain into the illicit 
market.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
Considering the relative lack of data, the results of this 
study are provisional. They offer a first analysis of the 
ITTP in Spain and show that more research and data are 
needed in this field.
•• Research regarding illicit cigarette demand in 
Spain is limited. There are no public surveys or 
studies on the demand for illicit tobacco products. 
Identifying the socio-economic characteristics of 
consumers and the reasons for illicit purchasing 
is fundamental for building effective strategies, 
preventing illicit behaviours, and reducing the demand 
for illicit tobacco. 
•• The penalty for a hypothetical ITTP case (see 
pp.51 and 52) ranges between 6 to 8 years of 
imprisonment for the leaders of the smuggling 
organisation and between 5 to 6 years of 
imprisonment for the other members of the 
organisation. However, the effective application of 
this penalty, in terms of number of years, is low 
(between 0 and 2 years). Further research on this 
issue may assess whether applicable penalties shape 
the perception of risk among ITTP smugglers and 
consequently impact on the ITTP in the country. 
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•• Investigative reports and media release indicate 
Gibraltar as one of the main source countries for illicit 
cigarettes consumed in Spain. Despite this, the EPSs 
report that less than 1% of the non-domestic packs 
originate from Gibraltar. Better and more certain 
identification of cigarettes packs originating from 
Gibraltar, through EPSs, would enable broader and 
more complete assessment of the ITTP deriving from 
this area. A significant improvement has been made 
with the KPMG Project Sun (2014), which provides 
a new methodology with which to estimate Gibraltar 
outflows on the basis of EPSs.
•• Several estimates are available on the illicit tobacco 
trade’s penetration of Spain. However, it would be 
important to distinguish among the different types 
of illicit tobacco products consumed and include 
illicit HRT. Moreover, the Project Sun could be 
improved with the participation of national institutions. 
In conclusion, the results of this study show that the 
ITTP is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Both 
individual factors, such as employment status and 
structural conditions such as proximity to countries with 
lower-priced tobacco products or to producers of illicit 
products, should be considered when developing anti-
ITTP policies. 
Given the complexity and the multitude of the factors 
involved, it is necessary to develop effective law 
enforcement and criminal justice policies. In addition, 
it is necessary also to adopt non-criminal measures 
to prevent illicit consumption and to reduce 
smuggling. Finally, the government should tackle the 
ITTP, especially in larger cities and near ports, with 
comprehensive strategies including criminal, non-criminal/
administrative, and other indirect measures, for example 
through a wide-ranging situational crime prevention 
approach. 
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